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RESCUING THE “SUPREME COURT” OF
SPORTS: REFORMING THE COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
ARBITRATION MEMBER SELECTION
PROCEDURES
“The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must
have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination
of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual
understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair
play.”1
INTRODUCTION
n 776 BCE, the first recorded Olympic Games took place in
Athens,2 where a cook named Coroebus won the first and
only Olympic event—a 192 meter footrace.3 Since then, modern
sports has transformed into an international multibillion dollar
commercial industry.4 A major catalyst for the commercializa-
tion of international sports was the decision of the Olympics to
allow professional athletes to compete in the Olympic Games.5
Prior to 1984, only amateur athletes were permitted to represent
their country at the Winter and Summer Olympic Games.6 The
change resulted in a massive increase in growth and commercial
appeal of sporting events. To illustrate, the 1960 Winter Olym-
pic Games produced $50,000 in U.S. television revenues.7 In
2014, however, NBC paid $7.65 billion simply to have the right
to broadcast the Olympic until 2032.8
1. Olympic Charter ¶ 4, entered into force Aug. 2, 2016,
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Gen-
eral/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf.
2. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 1 (5th ed. 2015).
3. See The Olympic Games, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/olym-
pic-games (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
4. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
5. See Viktoriya Pashorina-Nichols, Is The Court of Arbitration for Sport
Really Arbitration? 1, 9 (Victoria Univ. of Wellington, LLM Research Paper,
2015), http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/han-
dle/10063/5007/paper.pdf?sequence=1.
6. See id. at 9; Bob Green,What Changed the Olympics Forever, CNN (July
23, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs/.
7. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1115.
8. Id.
I
276 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
International and Olympic sports are organized through a
complex hierarchical system of sports organization responsible
for ensuring that the athletes who participate in sports win
fairly and through proper means.9 At the most fundamental
level, depending on the sport, individual athletes join clubs,
which form national federations.10 National federations may be
made up of member athletes competing in individual sports,
leagues competing in team sports, and regional associations.11
The national federation of each sport in each country organizes
the qualifying events to determine which athletes will represent
the country in international competition and, if eligible, the
Olympic Games.12 Each national athletic federation feeds into
the sport’s international athletic federation, which is responsible
for the integrity, development, and promotion of individual
sports at the international level.13 Each federation manages the
administration of their sports and the development of athletes
at every level of competition.14 Therefore, each sports’ interna-
tional federation is responsible for establishing and enforcing
the criteria for participation at every level of sports competi-
tion.15
Although international athletic federations operate autono-
mously and independently, in order to compete in the games, all
federations must seek recognition by the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), which owns and controls the Olympic Games,
and must act in accordance with the Olympic Charter.16 The
9. MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE 1683 (3d ed. 2014); Pashorina-Nichols, supra note 5, at 7.
10. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 9, at 1684.
11. Id.
12. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1116.
13. International Sports Federations, OLYMPIC, https://www.olympic.org/ioc-
governance-international-sports-federations (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). Cur-
rently, there are ninety-two international federations recognized by SportAc-
cord, the general association of international federations. See WEILER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 1116. See generally SPORTACCORD, http://www.sportaccord.com
(last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
14. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1116.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Olympic Charter serves three main purposes: (1) it serves as the
constitution to the Olympic Games, setting forth the fundamental principles
and mission of the Olympics; (2) it serves as the governing statutes of the IOC;
and (3) it “defines the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main
constituents of the Olympic Movement . . . all of which are required to comply
with the Olympic Charter.” Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at 11.
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Olympic Charter codifies the governing rules and bylaws of the
Olympic Games as well as the obligations and rights of the IOC,
International Federations, and the National Olympic Commit-
tees.17
Due to the complex organization and commercialization of
Olympic and international sports, which involves a multitude of
interested parties that enter into contractual relationships with
each other, a uniform, efficient, and quick method to resolve in-
evitable disputes becomes necessary.18 As participation in the
Olympic Games and international competition grew, disputes
between individual athletes and their sports governing bodies
increased over commercial contracts, competition results, and el-
igibility.19 Dispute resolution in domestic courts is inherently
difficult due to the involvement of various parties, such as inter-
national sports governing bodies, national sports governing bod-
ies and individual athletes whom all are subject to different na-
tional laws.20 Adjudicating international sports disputes in na-
tional courts raises complex choice-of-law issues and varying le-
gal systems, such as common law and civil law systems.21 Addi-
tionally, international sports bodies, such as the IOC and indi-
vidual athletic federations, seek to enforce uniform policies and
governing rules consistently.22 Furthermore, the unique nature
of sports and the requisite expertise make it difficult for individ-
ual judges in domestic courts to make consistent rulings.23 As a
17. See Olympic Charter, supra note 1, at 11. Currently, there are 206 Na-
tional Olympic Committees spanning over five continents. The National Olym-
pic Committees promote the fundamental principles of the Olympics at a na-
tional level for all Olympic sports. Additionally, National Olympic Committees
select and send athletes for participation at the Winter and Summer Olympic
Games. National Olympic Committees (NOCs), OLYMPIC, https://www.olym-
pic.org/ioc-governance-national-olympic-committees (last visited Mar. 22,
2017).
18. See Matthew J. Mitten, Judicial Review of Olympic and International
Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 51, 65 (2010).
19. Louise Reilly,An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
& the Role of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP.
RESOL. 63, 63 (2012).
20. Matthew Mitten & Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the De-
velopment of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dis-
pute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 283 (2010).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
278 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
result, the international athletic community relies on arbitra-
tion because it eliminates uncertainty otherwise found in na-
tional courts, which may have a vested interest in the outcome.24
Arbitration provides a neutral forum to quickly resolve disputes
with finality and procedural flexibility for private parties in-
volved.25 The international athletic community’s preference for
arbitration over domestic courts led to the development of an in-
dependent authority specializing in sports dispute resolution—
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).26
In 1984, the IOC created CAS as a division of the IOC dedi-
cated to hearing Olympic disputes.27 But, due to CAS’ designa-
tion as the exclusive arbitral body for Olympic disputes (and
later for the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) doping-re-
lated offenses in international competition), CAS has evolved
into the premiere forum for international athletic disputes.28
CAS offers quick and efficient dispute resolution.29 The exclusive
arbitral body hears various types of disputes, including commer-
cial contract disputes and appeals contesting positive drug
tests.30 At conception, the three main goals of CAS were: (1) “to
resolve disputes referred to it through ordinary arbitration;”31
(2) “to resolve through the appeals arbitration procedure dis-
putes concerning the decisions of the [individual] federations, as-
sociations, or other sports-related bodies;”32 and (3) to provide
24. SeeW. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT’LL.J. 1, 2 (1995).
25. See infra Part.I. Many sports-related disputes must also be resolved in
an expedient manner. For example, ad hoc Court of Arbitration for Sport pan-
els are available during the Olympic Games to resolve emergency disputes and
render decisions within twenty-four hours of filing. WEILER ET AL., supra note
2, at 1151.
26. Court of Arbitration for Sport [CAS],History of the CAS, CT. ARB. SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2016).
27. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143.
28. See Eric T. Gilson, Exploring the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 98 LAW
LIBR. J. 503, 504 (2006).
29. Reilly, supra note 19, at 76.
30. Gilson, supra note 28, at 504.
31. Adam Beach, ‘The Court of Arbitration for Sport’ – A Supreme Court for
the Sports World?, STUDENT J. INT’L L., no. 4, 2012,
https://sites.google.com/site/349924e64e68f035/issue-4/-the-court-of-arbitra-
tion-for-sport-a-supreme-court-for-the-sports-world (citing article S20 of the
1994 Code of Sports-related Arbitration).
32. Id.
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advisory opinions.33 Currently, clauses granting CAS exclusive
jurisdiction are found in essentially all contracts between indi-
vidual athletic federations and athletes participating in compe-
tition.34
Many legal scholars today credit the award decisions of CAS
for developing lex sportiva, which is a set of principles and rules
making up international sports law.35 In the formation of inter-
national sports law, CAS is credited with three different func-
tions.36 First, CAS develops specific principles of sport and ap-
plies general principles of law to sports institutions.37 Over the
years, CAS has developed specific principles of sport, including
the concept of “fair play” and the strict liability standard that is
applied to doping violations.38 Unlike a common law court, CAS
does not have binding precedent, and instead, arbitrators rely
on these legal principles to assist arbitrators in making deci-
sions.39 Second, CAS’ interpretation of sports law greatly influ-
ences rule-making decisions within international federations
and the IOC.40 Lastly, CAS is the primary contributor to the syn-
chronization of global sports law, connecting and harmonizing
both international and national sports law. As a result, CAS es-
sentially functions as the “Supreme Court” of sports.41
33. Id.
34. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1145.
35. Gilson, supra note 28, at 504. Prior to lex sportiva, many legal principles
and rules varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Lex sportiva resulted from
the need to harmonize sport regulations globally. Lorenzo Casini, The Making
of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1317,
1326 (2011). The development of lex sportiva has been compared to lex merca-
toria, the law of international commercial arbitration. Lex mercantoria is de-
scribed by the English Commercial Court as “the general law of merchants law
to which some international tribunals have regarded . . . which governs the
substantive rights and duties of parties to certain types of international trans-
actions to the exclusion of substantive law.” Michael Beloff, Is There a Lex
Sportiva?, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., no. 3, 2005, at *49, *53. Regulations, such as
the World Anti-doping Code, thus can be viewed as a direct result of this need
to homogenize international sports law. Casini, supra note 35, at 1326.
36. See Casini, supra note 35, at 1326.
37. See id.
38. See Richard Parrish, Lex Sportiva and EU Sports Law, 37 EUR. L. REV.
716, 718 (2012).
39. SeeMitten & Opie, supra note 20, at 286.
40. See Casini, supra note 35, at 1326.
41. Mitten & Opie, supra note 20, at 285; Casini, supra note 35, at 1334
(“This function is thus closely connected to the development of common legal
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CAS has been criticized in the international community for its
close ties to the IOC.42 In the past, athletes appealed arbitral
awards and argued that CAS was not a legitimate arbitral body
because it was a division of the IOC.43 Although CAS was upheld
as an independent and impartial arbitral body, CAS took proac-
tive steps to appear more independent from the IOC, which in-
cluded establishing the International Council of Arbitration for
Sport (ICAS) to run and finance CAS in the place of the IOC.44
CAS has taken additional steps to break ties from the IOC, but
there are still many in the international community who ques-
tion its independence. For example, in 2009, Romanian soccer
player Adrian Mutu challenged a breach of contract dispute with
the English Premier League Club, Chelsea, stemming from a
drug suspension.45 Mutu appealed CAS’ determination, arguing
that the CAS arbitrator lacked independence.46 Further, in a
case captivating the attention of the international sports com-
munity, German speed skater, Claudia Pechstein, challenged
CAS’ independence and impartiality in her domestic courts.47
Structural rules standardizing procedures must be in place to
resolve disputes between athletes and their respective athletic
federations in a neutral and consistent manner, away from na-
tional courts.48 If a German national court or any other domestic
court were to overturn CAS’ authority and declare the tribunal
is not independent and impartial, it would encourage athletes to
appear before their own domestic courts to resolve sports-related
disputes.49 In order to remain the supreme forum for interna-
tional sports disputes, it is essential that CAS is viewed as an
independent and impartial forum. If athletes are permitted to
flee to national courts when a CAS award is unfavorable, it will
result in the destruction of lex sportiva.
principles, such as legality, fairness and good faith as well as ‘general princi-
ples of law drawn from a comparative or common denominator reading of var-
ious domestic legal systems and, in particular, the prohibition of arbitrary or
unreasonable rules and measure[s].’”).
42. CAS, supra note 26.
43. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1147.
44. CAS, supra note 26.
45. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1149.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1142.
49. Id. at 1150.
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This Note explores whether CAS is the most objective forum to
settle international sports disputes. More specifically, it focuses
on CAS’ Appeals Arbitration Division, which hears disputes be-
tween athletes and athletic federations involving the Olympic
Games and international competition. If reforms and changes
are not implemented, both individual athletes and international
athletic organizations will turn to national courts—rendering
CAS effectively obsolete. In order for CAS to continue to perform
its vital function as international sports’ supreme court and fur-
ther develop specific legal principles for sport, institutional re-
form is required. CAS must redress the perceived structural im-
balance in the favor of the IOC and international athletic feder-
ations. CAS has implemented some reforms since its inception
in 1984, but the sports court must further reform arbitrator se-
lection procedures and utilize a tripanel of arbitrators to hear
disputes.
Part I of this Note will provide background on international
dispute resolution, examining why arbitration has become a pop-
ular dispute resolution method, and will describe CAS’ history
and evolution into the primary forum for settling international
sports disputes. Part II will analyze a recent case brought before
the CAS, Claudia Pechstein v. International Skating Union,
which threatened to upend CAS’ supreme authority, shedding
light on inherent deficiencies of impartiality and independence
in CAS. Pechstein, a world-class German speed skater chal-
lenged the two-year suspension imposed by the International
Skating Federation (ISU) for doping violations.50 After CAS up-
held her suspension, Pechstein subsequently challenged CAS’
fairness in German national courts, questioning whether CAS is
the most independent and objective forum to settle international
athletic disputes.51 Part III will then compare the CAS arbitra-
tion process to arbitration processes utilized by professional
sports leagues in Europe and the United States, specifically ex-
amining how the National Football League (NFL) in the United
States and Sports Resolutions in the United Kingdom adjudicate
athletic disputes. This Part will then analyze criticism the NFL
has received regarding the commissioner’s broad scope of powers
50. Mathias Wittinghofer & Sylvia Schenk, A Never Ending Story: Claudia
Pechstein’s Challenge to the CAS, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 14, 2016),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/06/14/a-never-ending-story-claudia-
pechsteins-challenge-to-the-cas/.
51. Id.
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in resolving disputes between individual athletes and the league
and will highlight the specialized arbitrator selection methods
found in Sports Resolutions to serve as a model for improve-
ments to CAS’ method of selecting arbitrators. Specialized arbi-
trator selection methods form arbitration panels comprised of
arbitrators with a balance of legal knowledge and expertise on
the topic in dispute in a fair and independent manner. Finally,
Part IV of this Note will propose that the arbitration and mem-
ber selection clauses in the 1994 Code of Sports-related Arbitra-
tion (“1994 CAS Code”) be revised to model Sports Resolutions.
Specifically, the arbitration member selection clauses shall be
redesigned to utilize tripanel arbitrations, which, in turn, will
result in a more balanced and independent arbitral decision.
This Note will argue further that CAS awards should be given
precedential value in published arbitration decisions, which will
thereby compel arbitrators to make more consistent and fairer
rulings.
I. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND CAS
The popularity of arbitration in resolving international dis-
putes influenced CAS’ development and success as the sole in-
ternational forum for sports arbitration proceedings. Through-
out this time, CAS has developed into an independent and ex-
clusive forum for dispute resolution in international athletic
competition. Yet, CAS has undergone major reform to establish
itself as an independent forum separate from the IOC, such as
the creation of the ICAS to independently run CAS and revisions
to CAS procedures and arbitrator selection methods. This Part
will then discuss the development of arbitration, specifically in-
ternational dispute resolution, as a neutral, enforceable, and
flexible dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, this Part will in-
troduce arbitration methods utilized in international athletic
competition and the creation and rise in popularity of CAS as
the exclusive forum to settle international athletic disputes.
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A. International Arbitration
The roots of commercial arbitration can be traced back to Me-
dieval Europe.52 English merchants first resorted to adjudica-
tion in special tribunals outside the Royal Courts because the
courts were not suited to serve the needs of these traders.53Early
courts in England were primarily interested in resolving dis-
putes over land and “conduct detrimental to the King’s peace.”54
Additionally, the majority of disputes either occurred abroad or
were between foreign merchants, therefore resulting in unen-
forceable judgments in national courts.55 Lastly, the courts
lacked the expediency merchants needed due to the normadic
nature of trade in Europe.56 The courts of fairs and boroughs de-
veloped to alleviate the aforementioned problems with tradi-
tional courts.57 Although these courts were eventually inte-
grated into English courts, the needs the courts of fairs and bor-
oughs sought to respond to influenced modern arbitration.58 Var-
ious other special tribunals were developed in Europe to address
the same needs.59
Modern arbitration developed in response to the Industrial
Revolution, which took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.60 The Industrial Revolution marked a transformation
from agrarian, rural societies in Europe and the United States
to the development of industrial manufacturing and urbaniza-
tion.61 Technological changes and manufacturization of goods re-
sulted in specialization of labor and the creation of labor organ-
izations, whose rules encouraged the use of arbitration by its
members.62 Arbitration institutions “provid[ed] for the resolu-
tion of disputes by respected members of the same profession
who would have extensive person[al] experience in the subject
52. See KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, US,
GERMAN AND FRENCH LAW 11 (2010).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Craig, supra note 24, at 6.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Industrial Revolution, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/top-
ics/industrial-revolution.
62. See id.; see also Craig, supra note 24, at 6.
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matter of the dispute.”63 Arbitration between members of trade
and professional groups provided an independent process from
the court systems that resulted in a final, binding resolution.64
Over the last fifty years, the international community has em-
braced and viewed arbitration as the primary means of resolving
disputes.65 The following factors have contributed to the popu-
larity of international arbitration: (1) enforceability, (2) neutral
forums, and (3) procedural flexibility and party autonomy.66 The
essential driving force for parties who seek arbitration is the de-
sire to avoid national courts and uncertainty of a foreign judici-
ary.67 Parties also fear foreign courts due to a perceived bias in
favor of domestic parties and the additional risk of delayed ap-
pellate review.68
One benefit of arbitration is that it allows for the enforceability
of decisions worldwide. In the post-World War II era, a major
concern for parties was the uncertainty of whether arbitration
decisions could be enforced in another country. In many in-
stances, prevailing parties who enlisted the losing party’s na-
tional courts to compel the enforcement of the award risked the
chance that the national courts would scrutinize the procedures
that led to the resulting award decision or simply ignore it.69 As
a result, the enforcement of international arbitration decisions
could only be accomplished by treaty.70 The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New
York Convention”)—which entered into effect in 1958—at-
tempted to alleviate this problem by establishing a multilateral
63. Craig, supra note 24, at 6.
64. See id.
65. See LATHAM & WATKINS, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2015),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-international-arbitration-
2014.
66. See id. Another attractive benefit to international arbitration is the abil-
ity to use arbitrators with appropriate experience. For example, “[a]rbitrators
can be selected for their familiarity with relevant commercial practices, trade
usages, and legal structures, and their ability to apply different national laws
and deal with comparative law issues.” Id. The ability to pick arbitrators with
particular expertise is also applicable when sports disputes are resolved
through arbitration. See id.
67. See Craig, supra note 24, at 2.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 9.
70. See id.
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instrument that ensured the enforcement of arbitral awards in-
ternationally.71 Article III of the New York Convention expressly
states that “[e]ach contracting State shall recognize arbitral
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules
of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, un-
der the conditions laid down in the [New York Convention].”72 In
other words, Article III articulates that any award rendered in
a country party to the New York Convention will be enforced in
any other New York Convention country.73 Today, the New York
Convention has gained international acceptance and is regarded
as the most successful treaty on arbitration laws.74
Arbitration is also advantageous because it provides a neutral
forum to settle disputes between parties from different coun-
tries.75 Conducting arbitration in a neutral forum avoids the
danger of a partisan judge siding with the contracting party from
the host jurisdiction.76 The ratification of the New York Conven-
tion increased the use of arbitration as an efficient and desirable
71. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; Craig, supra note 24, at 3. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses, adopted by the League of Nations in 1923, helped to ensure that ar-
bitration agreements and awards would be recognized as valid by Member
States. Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158. But,
this protocol did not ensure that arbitration awards would be enforced inter-
nationally. Id.
72. New York Convention, supra note 71, art. III.
73. See Craig, supra note 24, at 11.
74. See In Brief, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconven-
tion.org/in+brief (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
75. See Craig, supra note 24, at 12. Pierre Lalive discussed the three essen-
tial characteristics of a neutral arbitration site: (1) concrete neutrality, which
is the equal treatment of both parties; (2) political neutrality or the nonalle-
giance to a relevant political movement; and (3) judicial neutrality. See Pierre
Lalive,On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and the Place of Arbitration, in SWISS
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (1984). Lalive also stressed the im-
portance of state enterprise and organizational neutrality. See id. at 30. Plac-
ing arbitration in one party’s country is likely to give the state-enterprise party
substantial physical, practical, and psychological advantages. See id. at 30.
Therefore, there is a strong proclivity to not place arbitration in one party’s
country or, if the nature of the dispute is related, to a party. See id. at 30.
Although the IOC is not a state organization, nonetheless, it is as influential
as a state-run organization.
76. Craig, supra note 24, at 15 (“Placing the seat of arbitration in a country
other than those of the contracting parties avoids the danger of partisan, even
xenophobic, judge taking the side of one party.”).
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remedy for international commercial disputes but highlighted
the problem of determining where arbitration should be held.77
In many ordinary commercial cases, arbitration may be con-
ducted in the domicile of either party or other location previously
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute.78 In other cases, how-
ever, selecting a neutral forum is much more problematic. For
example, in many international commercial disputes, one party
may feel uncomfortable agreeing to arbitration in a developing
country or in a climate of political controversy.79 As a result of
these fears, Switzerland, which has guaranteed neutrality, has
become themost popular and logical host forum for international
arbitration proceedings, including CAS.80 In the 1960s and
1970s, when international arbitration became popular, Europe
was generally regarded as the most acceptable international ar-
bitration site because a majority of the parties involved came
from Europe or European colonies.81 Further, many legal sys-
tems in Africa and the Middle East were derived from European
civil codes, making Switzerland, and Europe in general, a cohe-
sive location to resolve disputes.82
Lastly, arbitration allows for procedural flexibility and party
autonomy. Switzerland became an attractive forum for interna-
tional arbitration because Swiss cantons83 were parties to the
77. See id. at 11.
78. See id. at 12.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 13. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna committed to guarantee
the neutrality of Switzerland. See SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARBITRATION INST.,
SWITZERLAND: NEUTRALITY, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION, A LONG AND UNIQUE
HISTORY (2016), https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/560/History/Arbitra-
tion%20and%20Mediation%20in%20Switzerland_History%2020161010%20fi-
nal%20published.pdf. Switzerland has long been the host of various non-gov-
ernmental dispute resolution organizations such as the United Nations, the
World Trade Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Id.
81. See Craig, supra note 24. The United States was not considered an ef-
fective arbitration site because it did not ratify the New York Convention until
1970. Id.Many foreign parties entering into contracts with U.S. parties feared
the complex litigation and intervention from the courts, thus, parties fre-
quently did not agree to arbitration in the United States. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. “Cantons” are Member States of the Swiss Confederation. Switzer-
land’s 26 Cantons (Federal States), ALL ABOUT SWITZ., http://swiss-govern-
ment-politics.all-about-switzerland.info/swiss-federal-states-cantons.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
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Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat of March 27, 1969 (“Con-
cordat”).84 The Concordat provides procedural flexibility by de-
ferring the procedural rules to the party’s specific arbitration
agreement.85 Today, international arbitration in Switzerland is
governed by Chapter 12 of the Federal Act on Private Interna-
tional Law enacted on December 18, 1987 (“PIL Act”), which
stresses neutrality as well as procedural and party autonomy.86
In arbitration, parties negotiate arbitration procedures in un-
derlying contracts prospectively in anticipation of a future dis-
pute.87 Contracting parties can design the process to accommo-
date their specific needs based on the underlying contractual re-
lationship.88 Prenegotiated arbitration procedures, such as time
limitations for completing the arbitral process, further enhance
efficiency and speed in reaching a decision.89 Procedural flexibil-
ity allows parties to select an arbitrator and a set of procedures
with specific knowledge about the substantive international na-
ture of the dispute.90 Additionally, the rules of evidence and civil
procedure are more lenient, and the arbitrators’ final decisions
are usually not subject to judicial review.91 Binding arbitration
precludes judicial review in a traditional court proceeding, un-
less the arbitrator abused his or her discretion by misconduct.92
84. Craig, supra note 24, at 13.
85. See id.
86. BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [FEDERAL ACT
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW], Dec. 18, 1987, AS 1776 (1988) (Switz.). The
Federal Act on Private International Law (“PIL Act”) leaves essentially all the
rules of the arbitration procedure up to the parties’ contractual arbitration
agreement, including the right to challenge arbitrators. Article 180 states that
an arbitrator may be challenged “if circumstances exist that give rise to justi-
fiable doubts as to his or her independence.” Id. art. 180. The PIL Act also
provides for setting aside final awards in Article 190—including “where the
sole arbitrator has been improperly appointed” as well as “where the principle
of equal treatment of the parties of their right to be heard in an adversary
procedure has not been observed.” Id. art. 190.
87. Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for Commer-
cial Disputes, A.B.A. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/March_2012_Suss-
man_Wilkinson_March_5.authcheckdam.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mitten & Opie, supra note 20, at 283.
91. Adam Epstein, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sport Management
and the Sport Management Curriculum, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 153, 158
(2002).
92. Id.
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Overall, these rules create an enforceable and neutral dispute
resolution system, which provides flexibility and efficiency in re-
solving international disputes. The advantages of international
commercial arbitration ultimately led to the adoption of arbitra-
tion in another expanding industry: international sports.
B. International Arbitration in Sports and the Development of
CAS
Due to their popularity, professional sports and international
competitions account for more than 3 percent of international
trade.93 From 2006 to 2014, revenue in the global sports market
increased from $107.52 billion to $146.47 billion.94 A majority of
the revenue is generated from contractual agreements between
players and international federations, players and individual
clubs, broadcast agreements, sponsorship agreements, and en-
dorsement deals.95 International viewership has also grown with
the development of new broadcasting platforms, including the
digitalization of modern sporting events.96 For example, the
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi were broadcast to 2.1 bil-
lion people globally, an increase of three hundred million view-
ers in just four years from the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, which
drew 1.8 billion viewers.97 For the first time in Olympic Games
history, digital coverage exceeded traditional television broad-
casts at the Winter Games in Sochi.98
93. Ian Blackshaw, Settling Sports Disputes by ADR: Some Major Sports
Dispute Resolution Bodies Modeled on the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 3
DISP. RESOL. INT’L, no. 2, 2009, at 169, 169.
94. Global Sports Market Revenue 2006-2015, STATISTA, http://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/194122/sporting-event-gate-revenue-worldwide-by-region-
since-2004/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
95. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143.
96. See INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., MARKETING REPORT SOCHI 2014, at 26 (2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Docu-
ments/IOC_Marketing/Sochi_2014/LR_MktReport2014_all_Spreads.pdf (“For
the first time at any Olympic Games, the amount of digital coverage available,
[through online streaming and the Olympic Video Player application, at the
2014 Olympics] exceeded that of traditional television broadcasts. . . .”).
97. Id. (“Ratings across the world consistently show that this is by far the
most-viewed Olympic Winter Games ever, and the reach of these Winter
Games is unprecedented.”).
98. Id. (“Of the total output, approximately 48,000 hours were shown on tel-
evision, . . . while 230 dedicated digital channels – including 155 websites and
75 apps – carried a total of 60,000 hours of digital broadcast coverage.”).
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In conjunction with the global reach of international athletic
competition and the increase in contractual agreements, the
number of disputes has also increased. This has resulted in the
need for a timely, cost-efficient, and neutral process to resolve
disputes. Unlike national courts, which may result in costly and
time-consuming battles about conflict of laws and jurisdictional
issues,99 arbitration, and specifically CAS, is preferable because
CAS provides dispute resolution services to handle disputes be-
tween athletes and their respective athletic federations and in-
ternational conflicts involving international competition, partic-
ularly the Olympic Games.100
In 1984, the IOC formed CAS as a means of offering agreeing
parties the opportunity to settle disputes more efficiently and
inexpensively than proceeding with litigation in national
courts.101 The original procedural regulations provided for sixty
arbitrator members.102 The IOC, the individual international
federations, the National Olympic Committees, and the IOC
President each appointed fifteen arbitrators.103
Initially, international athletic federations viewed the inde-
pendence of CAS as a threat.104 Outside the Olympic Games,
most parties did not utilize the new forum and, instead, submit-
ted most disputes to arbitrators selected by the individual inter-
national athletic federation, “who virtually always rendered de-
cisions in favor of the federation.”105 In 1991, however, the Inter-
national Equestrian Federation (“FEI”) became the first athletic
federation to require all disputes to be submitted to CAS.106 The
FEI adopted CAS’ arbitration clause giving CAS final authority
to hear disputes arising in the sport.107 Following FEI’s adoption
99. See John Griffiths, Procedural Fairness and Regulation of Sport: Les-
sons from the Common Law, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., no. 4, 2009, at *69, *71.
100. See id. at *69.
101. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143.
102. CAS, supra note 26.
103. Id.
104. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See CAS, supra note 26. The model arbitration clause read as follows:
Any dispute arising from the present Statutes and Regula-
tions of the . . . Federation which cannot be settled amicably
shall be settled finally by a tribunal composed in accordance
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of CAS arbitration procedures, a number of federations began
submitting disputes to CAS.108
Despite the growing acceptance of the CAS procedures by var-
ious federations, many athletes and certain other federations
still doubted CAS’ independence from the IOC. Parties feared
they could not obtain a fair hearing in front of CAS, particularly
if the IOC was the adverse party.109 At this time, CAS essentially
operated as a division of the IOC.110 For example, the IOC ab-
sorbed all operating costs,111 had the unilateral authority to
modify the CAS statute “at the proposal of the IOC Executive
Board,”112 and, through appointments designated by the IOC
President, held the power and influence to appoint thirty out of
sixty member seats of CAS.113 Additionally, because of the great
influence the IOC has over the federations, bias existed in choos-
ing specific arbitrator member seats.114
In February 1992, the authority of CAS was challenged by an
athlete claiming that CAS lacked independence and impartial-
ity. This appeal became the catalyst for major reforms to CAS
governance.115 In Gundel v. Federation Equestre Internationale,
the FEI disqualified and suspended equestrian Elmar Gundel
after his horse tested positive for doping.116 Gundel challenged
with the Statute and Regulations of the [CAS] to the exclu-
sion of any recourse to the ordinary courts. The parties un-
dertake to comply with the said Statute and Regulations, and
to accept in good faith the award rendered and in no way hin-
der its execution.
Id.
108. See id.Disputes brought before CAS include: “nationality of athletes and
contracts concerning employment, television rights, sponsorship and licensing,
and doping cases.” Id.
109. See Beach, supra note 31.
110. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143.
111. See CAS, supra note 26.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. Challenges to CAS awards are made before the Swiss Federal
Tribunal under the PIL Act. Id. The Swiss Supreme Court has exclusive juris-
diction to hear appeals of CAS awards. See generally Antonio Rigozzi, Chal-
lenging Awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 1 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 217, 217 (2010).
116. Rachelle Downie, Improving the Performance of Sport’s Ultimate Um-
pire: Reforming The Governance of The Court of Arbitration For Sport, 12
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2011).
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the FEI decision with CAS, and his suspension was reduced from
three months to one month.117 CAS concluded that Grundel was
negligent for not ensuring that his horse did not ingest banned
substances but reduced his suspension because the violation was
unintentional.118 Still unsatisfied, Gundel took his case to the
Swiss Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
appeals of CAS awards,119 arguing that the CAS award was not
decided by impartial arbitrators and was unenforceable because
of the close relationship between the IOC and FEI.120 Grundel
claimed that “when the CAS dismissed his appeal against sus-
pension, it lacked the independence required of arbitral tribu-
nals under Swiss law because the body that suspended him,
[FEI] was a member federation of the IOC, and the IOC estab-
lished the CAS.”121 Although the Swiss Supreme Court held that
CAS acted as an impartial and independent tribunal, the court
criticized the institutional proximity between CAS and the
IOC.122 The court expressed concern over the significant eco-
nomic ties that existed between CAS and the IOC, including that
the IOC funded the operating costs of CAS and played a substan-
tial role in appointing arbiters.123 The Swiss Supreme Court
stated that the “links would have been sufficient to call into
question the independence of the CAS in the event of the IOC
being a party to the proceedings before it.”124 But, in this case,
117. CAS, supra note 26.
118. See Beach, supra note 31.
119. See CAS, supra note 26; WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143, 1148. CAS
awards are appealable to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and this right cannot be
waived. Under Swiss law, appeals are granted when:
(1) the appealing party was effectively denied the right to be
heard before the arbitral tribunal; (2) the arbitral panel was
constituted irregularly; (3) the panel lacked impartiality; (4)
the panel erred in finding that it had jurisdiction over the
matter decided; (5) the panel’s award exceeded its authority
as submitted to it; and (6) the panel’s award contravened pub-
lic policy as defined under Swiss law. (emphasis added).
WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1148.
120. See Downie, supra note 116, at 7.
121. SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: THENEED FOR A “REALDANGER” TEST 115–16 (2009).
122. See CAS, supra note 26; LUTTRELL, supra note 121, at 116.
123. LUTTRELL, supra note 121, at 116.
124. CAS, supra note 26.
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because “CAS was not an organ of the FEI [and] did not receive
instructions from this federation” there was insufficient evi-
dence that CAS lacked impartiality.125 The message after Gun-
del, however, was perfectly clear—major reforms were necessary
to establish CAS’ organizational and financial independence
from the IOC.126
Influenced by the Swiss Supreme Court’s warning, the IOC
and the international athletic community were concerned that
the validity of CAS would continue to be called into question.
They also feared that increased challenges brought to national
courts127 would make international sports disputes “chaotic and
ungovernable.”128 The IOC specifically recognized the need to
standardize “the venue and the procedures by which disputes
within the world of sports would be resolved without leaving in-
dividual disputes to the inconsistencies and biases of national
courts in countries that had a vested interest in the outcome of
the cases.”129
As a result, the Agreement Concerning the Constitution of the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (“Paris Agree-
ment”) was promulgated on June 22, 1994, which ushered in the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144; Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Ath-
letic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). In 1990, the International Amateur
Athletic Federation (IAAF) found that, Butch Reynolds, a world-class amateur
track athlete, tested positive for an anabolic steroid. WEILER ET AL., supra note
2, at 1144. Rather than requesting a hearing from the Athletic Congress of the
United States, Inc. (“TAC”), the governing body of national track and field,
Reynolds instead filed an action against the IAAF in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, arguing that the test results were erroneous
because the drug test was administered incorrectly. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1110,
1112. The court found that Reynolds did not exhaust his administrative reme-
dies provided by TAC. Id. Subsequently, Reynolds appealed his suspension to
TAC and the IAAF. Id. at 1113. The IAAF arbitration panel upheld Reynolds’
suspension, finding that the drug test administration was valid. Id. Reynolds
appealed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio again and
sought money damages and a restraining order to allow him to compete at the
Olympic trials. Id. The court granted Reynolds a temporary restraining order
to allow him to participate in the Olympic Trials, where TAC threatened other
athletes with suspension if they competed with Reynolds. Id. The court
awarded Reynold’s money damages and found that the international federa-
tion “acted with ill will and a spirit of revenge towards Mr. Reynolds.” Id. at
1114.
128. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144.
129. Id. at 1142.
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modern independent CAS we see today.130 Changes included re-
moving CAS’ headquarters from IOC offices131 and creating two
separate divisions: the Ordinary Appeals Division and the Ap-
peals Arbitration Division.132 The Ordinary Appeals Division
hears private disputes arising from the practice and develop-
ment of sports that the parties initially agreed to submit to
CAS.133 Meanwhile, the Appeals Arbitration Division hears ap-
peals against individual athletic federations following the initial
decision or suspension imposed by a sports-related body.134 The
Appeals Arbitration Division hears about 90 percent of the filed
challenges.135 Further, 30 percent of these cases relate to doping
violations filed under the World Anti-Doping Code (“WADA
Code”).136 The Paris Agreement also completely revised and out-
lined new procedural guidelines of the CAS Code, which governs
arbitrator selection procedures of the CAS.137 The most im-
portant reform was the implementation of ICAS.138 According to
the 1994 CAS Code, “[t]he purpose of ICAS is to . . . safeguard
the independence of CAS and the rights of the parties.”139 Ulti-
mately, ICAS is responsible for the administration and financing
of CAS, which helped to sever its ties from the IOC.140 The 1994
CAS Code was greatly influenced by arbitration guidelines laid
out in the United Nations Commission on International Trade
130. Id. at 1144.
131. Id. Additional changes include the addition of mediation services and
the creation of an ad hoc division specifically for disputes arising during Olym-
pic competition. Id.
132. Beach, supra note 31. In 1996, CAS created an ad hoc division to resolve
disputes at the Olympic Games. Gilson, supra note 28, at 505.
133. See Beach, supra note 31; CODE OF SPORTS RELATED ARBITRATION art.
S20 (COURT OFARBITRATION FORSPORT 1994) [hereinafter 1994 CASCODE]; Gil-
son, supra note 28, at 506.
134. Beach, supra note 31. A majority of the disputes brought before the Or-
dinary Appeals Division include contractual and tort matters. Costs in the Or-
dinary Appeals Division are estimated before the proceeding, and each party
is required to split the costs. In contrast, CAS bears the cost of all matters
heard by the Appeals Arbitration Division. Gilson, supra note 28, at 506.
135. Reilly, supra note 19, at 65.
136. Id. at 70.
137. See generally 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133.
138. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 505.
139. 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. S2.
140. Id.
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Law (UNCITRAL)141 and the International Court of Arbitration
rules.142
Under Article S4 of the 1994 CAS Code, ICAS is composed of
twenty members bound to be objective and independent in up-
holding the code.143 In selecting the members of ICAS, the IOC,
the international athletic federations, and the Association of the
National Olympic Committees collectively appoint twelve mem-
bers.144 Those twelve members in turn appoint the remaining
eight members of the ICAS.145Members of ICAS must be experts
in both arbitration and sports law.146 The council also elects a
president, who also acts as CAS President.147 Additionally, ICAS
members elect two vice-presidents and presidents for the Ordi-
nary Arbitration Division and the Appeals Arbitration Division
of CAS.148 Procedurally, the division presidents handle all arbi-
tration proceedings before the panel of arbitrators are se-
lected.149 The duties of each division president include setting up
an arbitration schedule, creating the framework for arbitrator
selection, and issuing orders regarding requests for interim re-
lief.150
To ensure fairness and independence, the ICAS members ap-
point a minimum of 150 arbitrators for renewable four-year
terms.151 Members must “[have] appropriate legal training, rec-
ognize competence with regard to sport law and/or international
141. Craig, supra note 24, at 26. Similar to the aim of the New York Conven-
tion, which is to reduce the court’s role in the enforcement of arbitration
awards, the purpose of UNCITRAL Model Law is to reduce the role of local
courts in international arbitrations. Id. The UNCITRAL Secretariat justified
this goal on the basis that “parties to an arbitration agreement make a con-
scious decision to exclude court jurisdiction and, in particular in commercial
cases, prefer expediency and finality to protracted legal battles in court.” Id.
142. Downie, supra note 116, at 8.
143. Id. In addition to the appointment of CAS arbitrators, ICAS is responsi-
ble for all amendments to the 1994 CAS Code, the election of officers, including
the president, two vice-presidents, and the division presidents. 1994 CAS
CODE, supra note 133, art. S6.
144. 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. S4.
145. Id.
146. See CAS, supra note 26.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. Currently, there are 369 arbitrators on the general list. Id.
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arbitration and [have] a good command of at least one CASwork-
ing language. . . .”152 According to Article S14 of the 1994 CAS
Code, the arbitration pool is distributed as follows: one-fifth is
chosen by the IOC, one-fifth is nominated by international ath-
letic federations, one-fifth is nominated by National Olympic
Committees, one-fifth is chosen with a view to safeguard the in-
terests of athletes, and one-fifth is chosen from “persons inde-
pendent of the bodies responsible for proposing arbitrators in
conformity with the [requirements of the 1994 CAS Code]”153 Ar-
bitrators may hear matters in both the Ordinary Appeals Divi-
sion and the Appellate Appeals Division.154
Today, CAS, which is located in Lausanne, Switzerland, has
essentially become the exclusive forum for international sports-
related disputes.155 The forum hears challenges involving eligi-
bility of athletes to compete in the Olympic Games and various
international competitions, positive drug test results, technical
decisions made by officials during competition,156 and disputes
concerning international commercial contracts.157 The CAS of-
fers speedy and efficient resolution to disputes involving the
Olympics and international athletic competition.158
The new provisions of the 1994 CAS Code create the appear-
ance of institutional independence and good governance for
CAS.159 While these steps give the appearance of impartiality,
there is still debate as to whether CAS masks the IOC’s influ-
ence.160 Three-fifths of the arbitrators appointed to the list con-
152. 1994 CASCODE, supra note 133, art. S14. Disputes heard in CAS can be
conducted in either English or French. Id. art. R29.
153. Id. art. S14; see also Downie, supra note 116, at 8.
154. CAS, supra note 26.
155. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144; Alexandra Veuthey, Re-ques-
tioning the Independence of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Light of the
Scope of Review, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., no. 4, 2013, at *105, *105 (“In 2012, no
fewer than 374 requests were filed at its clerks office.”); see also Statistics, CT.
ARB. SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_up-
load/CAS_Statistics_2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
156. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 504.
157. See Reilly, supra note 19, at 63.
158. See id. at 78.
159. Downie, supra note 116, at 7, 14.
160. Id. at 14.
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sist of candidates are nominated by individual athletic federa-
tions and the IOC.161 Therefore, the scales are still tipped signif-
icantly in favor of the controlling governing bodies and against
the individual athletes.162
Ultimately, the trust of the international athletic community
is imperative to preserving the integrity of CAS. If athletes do
not believe the IOC and their respective athletic federations are
ensuring fairness and integrity in the sport, it will trickle down
to render the basic principles of athletic competition untrustwor-
thy. Although the 1994 CAS Code developed under the Paris
Agreement establishes independence from the IOC, athletes
have increasingly begun to challenge the impartiality of CAS—
specifically the appointment of arbitrators.163 There has been a
surge in the number of CAS award challenges filed with the
Swiss Supreme Court.164 For example, over half of the interna-
tional arbitrations appeals filed with the Swiss Supreme Court
are CAS challenges.165 Most importantly, some individual ath-
letes are bringing challenges directly to national courts rather
than to the governing bodies of their individual sports as in-
tended, thereby limiting the number of cases brought before
CAS.166 If CAS awards are overturned in the national courts, it
could have catastrophic consequences for the “Supreme Court”
of sports.167
II. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF CAS APPEALS INNATIONAL
COURTS AND A CRITIQUE OF CAS CODE REVISIONS
In order for CAS to be an effective tool in international sports
arbitration, it is critical for national courts to recognize the en-
forcement clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to CAS.168 Un-
certainty about CAS’ independence, however, has led to chal-
161. See Andrew Smith, The Pechstein Judgment: CAS’s Reaction and Poten-
tial Ramifications, LAW SPORT (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.lawinsport.com/ar-
ticles/item/the-pechstein-judgment-cas-s-reaction-potential-ramifications.
162. See id.
163. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1149.
164. See Reilly, supra note 19, at 75.
165. Id.
166. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1149.
167. Mitten & Opie, supra note 20, at 285 (“In 1981, Juan Samaranch, who
was the then-current IOC president, envisioned a ‘supreme court for world
sports.’”).
168. SeeWEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144–45.
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lenges in national courts, threatening CAS’ place as the final ar-
biter of international sports disputes.169 Significantly, the case
of German speed skater, Claudia Pechstein, marks the first time
a challenge to CAS has made it all the way to an athletes’ high-
est national court. Professional athletes disputing CAS award
decisions in both national courts and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) has severe implications for CAS and lex
sportiva. Furthermore, subsequent actions taken by CAS to re-
vise arbitration procedures have not been sufficient in remedy-
ing the perception of institutional bias of CAS. This Part will
describe the significance of Claudia Pechstein’s challenge to the
validity of CAS arbitration awards in national courts and dis-
cuss the consequences of this litigation. Furthermore, this Part
will critique the revisions made to the CAS Code following the
Pechstein litigation. Lastly, this Part will explore the effects of
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on CAS ar-
bitration.
A. Claudia Pechstein v. International Skating Union
The case of Pechstein marked a significant challenge to CAS’
role as the primary and final arbiter in resolving sports disputes
between individual athletes and their respective athletic feder-
ations. In 2009, the ISU suspended German world-class speed
skater Claudia Pechstein for two years for blood doping.170 Dur-
ing the 2009 Speed Skating World Championships, Pechstein’s
voluntary drug test showed irregular blood parameters, which
169. See id. at 1144, 1149.
170. See Kevin Draper, A Lawsuit Threatens the Future of The Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport, DEADSPIN (Feb. 18, 2015, 11:14 PM), http://deadspin.com/a-
lawsuit-threatens-the-future-of-the-court-of-arbitrat-1686685232 (“[B]lood
samples collected from Ms. Pechstein at the World Championships in Hamar
in February of 2009 were deemed to be inconsistent with her biological pass-
port, showing elevated levels of reticulocytes in her blood.”); Danielle Sharkey
& Huw Roberts, Skating on Thin Ice: The Independence of CAS is Challenged,
26 ENT. L. REV. 117, 117 (2015). Pechstein’s normal levels were between 0.4%
and 2.4% of reticulocyte, but the blood screening at Hamar showed counts “well
above 2.4% and which then sharply decreased.” Pechstein v. Int’l Skating Un-
ion, Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision, Feb. 10, 2010, 4A_612/2009 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4A_612/2009], http://www.swis-
sarbitrationdecisions.com/sites/default/files/10%20fe-
vrier%202010%204A%20612%202009.pdf.
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was deemed inconsistent with her biological passport.171 Pech-
stein appealed the decision to CAS, where she argued that a ge-
netic abnormality rather than blood doping caused the positive
drug test results.172 Due to the contractual clauses imposed on
her by the German national skating federation and ISU, Pech-
stein’s only choice was to appeal the ISU decision to CAS.173 On
November 25, 2009, Pechstein’s appeal was dismissed on its
merits.174 The CAS did not reverse her suspension because the
medical evidence Pechstein presented to explain the abnormal-
ity in her blood did not constitute new evidence.175
Subsequently, Pechstein filed an appeal with the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal (SFT) disputing the CAS decision (upholding the
171. Despina Mavromati, The Legality of the Arbitration Agreement in Fa-
vour of CAS Under German Civil and Competition Law, in COURT OF
ARBITRATION BULLETIN 27 (2016), http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_up-
load/Bulletin_2016_1.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2017); Draper, supra note 170.
172. See Draper, supra note 170. Pechstein never actually failed a drug test.
The ISU concluded that she was blood doping because the biological passport
showed deviations from the baseline before some races. Sharkey & Roberts,
supra note 170, at 179. Her “biological passport” was created by collecting over
ninety blood samples in order to monitor changes to her biological character.
Id. The development of the biological passport, “make[s] it easier to detect the
effects of any use of prohibited substances.” Id. (“Athlete Biological Passport
(ABP) is a very important development in the ongoing fight against doping,
which has been praised by some as a ‘breakthrough in the fight against doping’
and criticized by others as being ‘an aggressive new approach’ raising ‘serious
concerns.’”). The ABP records the athlete’s body levels over time using biologi-
cal markers to assess “whether there has been an odd deviation from that ath-
lete’s baseline values, in order to indirectly detect a doping practice.”Massimo
Coccia, The Athlete Biological Passport: Legal and Scientific Aspects, INT’L
SPORTS L. REV., no. 1, 2013, at *9, *10. See generally WORLD ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY [WADA], ATHLETEBIOLOGICALPASSPORT (ABP)OPERATINGGUIDELINES
(2017), https://www.wada-ama.org/en/resources/athlete-biological-pass-
port/athlete-biological-passport-abp-operating-guidelines.
173. See Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
174. See Smith, supra note 161.
175. See Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4A_612/2009.
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ban) and sought a rehearing of the case in CAS.176 Pechstein ar-
gued that her case was the “litmus test”177 for the success of the
WADA blood passport, which detected prohibited substances.
She claimed that CAS’ primary interests “[were] those of the
[IOC] and the international sporting associations in general,
which consider economic value of the Olympic Games and their
sporting events to be at risk as the result of doping issues.”178
After a hearing on February 10, 2012, the SFT rejected Pech-
stein’s appeal.179 The SFT based the decision on the principle of
good faith.180 During initial appeals to CAS, one must immedi-
ately raise objections to the arbitration proceedings in order for
the applicant to maintain a claim thereafter. Since Pechstein
never raised any issues about the independence of CAS during
her initial appeal, the SFT stated that she waived the right to
invoke that ground for appeal.181 Furthermore, the court held
that Pechstein incorrectly invoked Article 6(1) of the ECHR,
which protects the right to a fair trial, because the provision was
not applicable to voluntary arbitration proceedings.182 As a re-
sult, the SFT upheld the two-year suspension imposed by the
ISU.183
Although Pechstein’s appeal to the SFT was the final appeal
allowed under the arbitration clause establishing CAS’ author-
ity, she sued the ISU for €4 million in damages in a local civil
176. See Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117. The applicable Swiss
law states that “[w]ithin the framework of an appeal before the SFT against a
CAS award, the lack of independence of impartiality must be raised under
Art.190(2)(a) of the PILA.” Veuthey, supra note 155, at *109. Article 190 of
PILA states that the award may only be annulled under (2)(a) “if the sole arbi-
trator was not properly appointed or if the arbitral tribunal was not properly
constituted.” Id.
177. Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4A_612/2009. Pechstein claimed that,
before her appeal to CAS, IOC president Jacques Rogge declared that her case
was a “litmus test to see if the long-term profile of the international scientific
community [wa]s confirmed.” Id.
178. Id.
179. Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
180. Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4A_612/2009.
181. Id. According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, “[t]he Appellant herself ap-
pealed to the CAS and signed the Procedural Order of September 29, 2009
without raising objections with respect to independence or impartiality.” Id.
182. Id.; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
183. Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
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court in Munich for lost income during her suspension.184 Pech-
stein also filed a complaint with the ECtHR claiming that the
SFT did not provide a fair trial, and thus violated her human
rights, because they did not adequately review the CAS deci-
sion.185 The Local Court of Munich held that the arbitration
clause in Pechstein’s contract was void because, in order to com-
pete, she had no other option but to sign the arbitration agree-
ment with the ISU.186 The court held that the forced arbitration
clause violated the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the
ECHR187 and concluded that “CAS arbitration did not satisfy all
the requirements of Article 6 . . . owing to the way in which ar-
bitrators are appointed and the institutional bias in favor of
sports federations.”188 Despite this finding, the court did not va-
cate the CAS arbitration award because res judicata precluded
the German court from reconsidering the award.189 Similar to
the SFT’s reasoning for dismissing Pechstein’s appeal, the Ger-
man court upheld the CAS award because Pechstein did not ini-
tially raise objections to the arbitral process and the impartiality
of the arbitration panel.190
On January, 15, 2015, however, the appellate court, the Mu-
nich Higher Regional Court (MHRC), overturned the Local
Court of Munich’s dismissal and refused to recognize the CAS
award as “contrary to public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the
New York Convention,”191 which provides an exception to uni-
versal recognition and enforcement under the New York Con-
vention and vacates arbitral awards if they are found to be con-
trary to the public policy of the country where enforcement is
184. Id.; Wittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 50.
185. Smith, supra note 161.
186. Id.
187. Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
188. Smith, supra note 161.
189. See id. Despite this determination, “[t]he court still rejected Ms. Pech-
stein’s claim since she had not contested the competence of CAS when she had
first appealed the ISU’s decision. The court therefore felt bound to recognize
the CAS’s res judicata effect and the CAS decision was duly upheld under the
New York Convention.” Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
190. Smith, supra note 161.
191. Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117. Article V(2)(b) states that
“[r]ecognition and enforcement of the arbitration award may also be refused if
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that: The recognition or enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to public policy of that country.” New York Convention, supra note 71,
art. V(2)(b).
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sought.192 The MHRC held that the arbitration clause naming
CAS the exclusive arbitral forum violated German antitrust law,
which “prohibits undertakings in a dominant position from im-
posing contractual conditions that are more restrictive than the
norm.”193 Therefore, the court concluded that Pechstein’s CAS
award was incompatible with German public policy because the
ISU required Pechstein to exclusively defer to CAS if she wanted
to compete, with no opportunity to go to her national court.194
Ultimately, the MHRC did not find actual bias of the arbitra-
tion panel appointed to hear Pechstein’s appeal.195 The MHRC
did note, however, that the structure of ICAS weighs heavily in
favor of the individual athletic federations.196 The court implied
192. See New York Convention, supra note 71, art. V(2)(b).
193. Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 117.
194. Id. German antitrust laws prohibit companies from abusing a market-
dominant position. The Higher Regional Court in Munich concluded that ISU
compelled Pechstein to sign the arbitration agreement, giving CAS the ulti-
mate authority, and thus violated German antitrust law. Ulrich Haas, The
Court of Arbitration for Sport in the Case Law of German Courts, INT’L SPORTS
L. REV., no. 4, 2015, at *71, *75 (2015). Additionally, according to the German
lower courts, “an arbitration agreement with the hierarchically subordinate
sportsman can ‘only be valid if he has a genuine right to choose whether an
ordinary court or a sports arbitral tribunal should rule on disputes involving
him.’” Id. at *73.
195. Smith, supra note 161.
196. See id.Unidentified leaks disclosed the athletes under investigation. Mi-
chael A. Hiltzik, Athletes See Doping Case Appeals as Futile Exercise, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/dec/11/local/la-me-dop-
ing11dec11/2. Additionally, public statements were made that declared the
guilt of athletes before CAS heard the appeal. Charles Pelkey, Dick Pound
Talks Floyd Landis, Lance Armstrong and the System, VELO NEWS, http://ve-
lonews.competitor.com/2010/06/news/dick_pound_interview_2010_119685
(last updated Jan. 25, 2017). For example, WADA Chairman RichardW. Pound
publically made comments asserting Tour de France champion cyclist Lance
Armstrong’s guilt. Id. Pound’s comments were based on confidential data from
WADA’s lab and stemmed from a 2005 article published in the French news-
paper L’Equipe. Id. The report matched urine sample identification numbers
to Armstrong, which indicated the use of banned substances. Id. With respect
to the article, Pound said there was “now an onus on Lance Armstrong and
others to explain how it [banned substances] got in their systems.” Id.; see also
Charles Pelkey, L’Equipe Alleges Armstrong Samples Show EPO Use in 99
Tour, VELO NEWS, http://velonews.competitor.com/2005/08/tour-de-
france/lequipe-alleges-armstrong-samples-show-epo-use-in-99-tour_8740 (last
visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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that the IOC and the athletic federations disproportionately in-
fluenced the selection of arbitrators197 because the selection list
of arbitrators gave substantial structural predominance to the
sports institutions in dispute with individual athletes.198 Fur-
thermore, the court found legitimate concerns regarding the in-
dependence and impartiality of CAS panels in general, stating
that there is “a lack of transparency” in the method of appointing
the President of CAS panels because, under CAS Code 40.2, the
president of each CAS panel is appointed directly by the Appeals
Arbitration Division President.199
Undeterred, Pechstein appealed to Germany’s highest civil
court, the German Federal Court of Justice.200 On July 14, 2015,
the International Federation of Professional Footballers
(“FIFPro”), the representative organization for all professional
soccer players, announced it would financially back Pechstein’s
legal proceedings in the German Federal Court of Justice.201 The
players’ union, which represents over sixty-five thousand profes-
sional athletes, emphatically expressed support for Pechstein,
stating:
Every athlete as a citizen and worker has the right to a fair
process and to be judged in an independent and impartial
court. The decisions of the regional courts in Germany . . . con-
firmed that this right was not duly granted by CAS at the time
of her anti-doping case.202
On June 7, 2016, however, the court rejected Pechstein’s ap-
peal and held that she received a fair hearing by CAS, thus con-
firming CAS’ role as the supreme arbiter of international sports
disputes.203 While the court confirmed the monopolistic struc-
ture of athletic federations in its decision, it found that the bind-
ing arbitration clauses Pechstein was forced to sign to compete
197. Smith, supra note 161.
198. Haas, supra note 194, at *75. The court criticized the arbitrator list be-
cause “this pre-defined list was appointed by the [ICAS], a body which is com-
prised of 20 members, 12 of whom are nominated by the IOC, and [where] 3/5
of the arbitrators . . . [are]appointed upon proposals made by sports governing
bodies.” Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 118.
199. Smith, supra note 161.
200. SeeMavromati, supra note 171, at 27.
201. FIFPro Backs Claudia Pechstein’s Legal Battle, FIFPRO (July 14, 2015),
https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-backs-claudia-pechstein-s-legal-battle/en/.
202. Id.
203. SeeWittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 50.
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internationally did not violate her right to a fair trial.204 The
court reasoned that Pechstein freely entered into the arbitration
agreement with the ISU, which waived her right to bring cases
in her home country.205 Contrary to the MHRC, the German Fed-
eral Court of Justice held that “[t]he procedure of drawing up the
list of arbitrators of CAS indicates no structural imbalance im-
pairing the independence and neutrality of the CAS to such an
extent that its position as a ‘true’ court of arbitration could be
called into question.”206 The court noted that there was no indi-
cation of structural imbalance in individual cases because arbi-
trators are chosen out of a list of more than three hundred peo-
ple, and athletes can reject an arbitrator for bias.207 The CAS
applauded the decision for setting a significant precedent vali-
dating CAS’ supreme authority.208 Despite the fact that most
athletes do not have the resources to challenge CAS’ authority
in a lengthy court battle, the case highlights major problems of
the court and doubts of the athletic community regarding the
independence and impartiality of CAS.
B. Implications of Pechstein’s Appeals for CAS
Although the German Federal Court of Justice did not rule in
Pechstein’s favor, and Pechstein’s complaint to the ECtHR has
not yet been decided, the implications of Pechstein’s legal fight
in her national courts still threaten the autonomy of CAS.209
Generally, national courts are reluctant to overturn CAS arbi-
tration decisions under public policy standards of the New York
Convention.210 In its decision, however, the MHRC directly un-
dermined the authority of CAS, which threatens to open up a
204. See Rebecca Ruiz, Court Upholds Authority of Arbitration Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2016, at B13.
205. Id.
206. Mavromati, supra note 171, at 49.
207. SeeWittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 50.
208. See Ruiz, supra note 204.
209. See id.; Sharkey & Roberts, supra note 170, at 118.
210. See Daniel H. Yi, Turning Medals into Metal: Evaluating the Court of
Arbitration of Sport as an International Tribunal, 6 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. &
TRADE L. 289, 327 (2006). The New York Convention’s public policy defense is
very narrow. See Slaney v. Int’l Athletic Amatuer Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 828 (2001). In Slaney, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld an arbitration award determining that Slaney
committed a doping violation. Id. The court stated that the public policy de-
fense under the New York Convention requires a showing that “the challenged
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flood of litigation into national courts, making CAS obsolete.211
If athletes seek redress through their national courts, chaos will
ensue due to the different legal systems, which have different
procedural rules and lengthy litigation.212
Regardless of the outcome in the German Federal Court of Jus-
tice and the ECtHR, support of Pechstein from the international
athletic community indicates dissatisfaction with CAS. In addi-
tion to FIFPro’s financial and public support, individual athletes
have spoken in support of Pechstein’s legal battle.213 Robert
Harting, a German Olympic discus thrower, expressed his sup-
port, stating that many athletes “believe mandatory arbitration
is unfair” but sign anyway in order to compete, and “clean ath-
letes who believe they have been wrongfully barred by [CAS]
have no other options to clear their name.”214 Furthermore, Un-
ion Network International World Athletes, the world players’ as-
sociation, applauded Pechstein for her courage to stand up to
CAS and committed to continue to fight for reform for interna-
tional sport dispute resolution, stating that “[t]he court’s deci-
sion exacerbates the crisis of confidence with sport’s justice sys-
tem that prevails among player associations, and certainly does
not bring this to an end. . . . The CAS must have the confidence
of those most affected by its decisions – the players.”215
award ‘violated the most basic notions of morality and justice.’” Mitten, supra
note 18, at 63.
211. Smith, supra note 161. The concern is that,
if other national courts were to follow the Munich Higher
Court’s lead by refusing to recognize CAS awards, re-litigat-
ing the merits of the cases and then handing out punitive
damage awards against sports organizations, it would surely
sound the death knell for CAS as an institution and for the
international sports arbitration system as we know it.
Id.
212. Amanda Coletta, Speedskater is Poised to Upend Rule of Sports’Highest
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2016, at B8. Before the appeal in the German Fed-
eral Court of Justice, Pechstein’s attorney, Thomas Summerer, stated that “[i]f
we are successful, all athletes might think about circumventing the CAS.” Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Brendan Schwab, Players Will Continue Claudia Pechstein’s Heroic
Fight to Reform Sport’s Justice System, UNI GLOBAL UNION (June 7, 2016),
http://www.uniglobalunion.org/news/players-will-continue-claudia-pech-
steins-heroic-fight-reform-sports-justice-system. Union Network International
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Although the German Federal Court of Justice’s decision pre-
served CAS’ dominance as the premiere final arbiter of sports
disputes, CAS, the IOC, and the international athletic commu-
nity as a whole should take notice. The lower court’s criticisms
of CAS creates a stronger incentive for individual athletes and
federations to bring CAS award challenges to national courts ra-
ther than the SFT.216 If athletes and sports organizations do not
fully trust CAS’ independence and impartiality, the number of
appeals to national courts will surely rise, which is likely to re-
sult in contradictory rulings and time-consuming and costly lit-
igation. This would destroy the role of CAS as the exclusive, im-
partial forum for international sports related disputes.
The MHRC was expressly critical of the institutional impar-
tiality created by Article S4 and S14, which governs ICAS and
arbitration panel appointments, respectively, under the CAS
Code.217 Simultaneous to Pechstein’s litigation in Germany in
2012, ICAS took proactive steps to remedy these allegations by
removing the “one-fifth” appointment system.218 The removal of
the quota system appeared to eliminate the structural imbal-
ance favoring the individual federations.219 Removing the quota
requirement exhibits CAS’ new focus on the capabilities and
World Athletes is an association of eighty-five thousand athletes through ma-
jor player associations, including FIFPro, EU Athletes, the U.S. National Bas-
ketball Players Association, the U.S. National Football League Players Associ-
ation, and the National Hockey League Players Association. Id.
216. WEILER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143, 1149. It would also have serious
implications for the World Anti-doping Agency by undermining their fight
against doping if substantive rules and procedures would have to be changed.
217. Smith, supra note 161.
218. CODE OF SPORTS RELATED ARBITRATION (COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR
SPORT 2012) [hereinafter 2012 CAS CODE]. Article S14 now expressly states:
In establishing the list of CAS arbitrators, the ICAS shall call
upon personalities with full legal training, recognized compe-
tence with regard to sports law and/or international arbitra-
tion, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good com-
mand of at least one CAS working language, whose names
and qualifications are brought to the attention of the ICAS,
including by IOC, the I[nternational] F[ederation]s and the
N[ational] O[lymic] C[ommittee]s.” (emphasis added).
Id. art. S14.
219. Smith, supra note 161.
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skills of the individual arbitrators selected rather than main-
taining equal representation of the institutions.220 This change,
however, still does not guarantee an arbitrary pool of candidates
in practice.221 The closed arbitration pool may still consist of an
imbalanced number of institutional members, which would
thereby continue to tip the scales in favor of the leagues and fed-
erations.
After Pechstein, subsequent revisions were made to the 1994
CAS Code, which included the addition of a “special list of arbi-
trators” who provide specific expertise for certain types of dis-
putes.222 For example, this new list may lead to more consistent
results in anti-doping-related proceedings.223 Currently, it is
common for nearly identical factual scenarios to have vastly dif-
ferent results in doping arbitration proceedings.224 The special
list may be beneficial to anti-doping proceedings because arbi-
trators will have more specialized knowledge of the complexities
in the WADA Code, therefore leading to greater consistency.
Furthermore, the specialized list may contribute to the desired
expediency of arbitration proceedings because parties unfamil-
iar with CAS proceedings would be able to quickly identify expe-
rienced arbitrators for the dispute in question.225
Nonetheless, athletes still can challenge the independence of
CAS, even under the new changes made to the 1994 CAS Code.
Further narrowing the arbitrators available on the closed list
has the potential to tip the balance even more in favor of the
institutions226 because there is a greater probability that a spe-
cialized arbitrator will have either worked for or was closely as-
sociated with the IOC, WADA, or another sports federation.227 It
220. Antonio Rigozzi, Erika Hasler, & Brianna Quinn, The 2011, 2012, 2013
Revisions to the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK
(June 3, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411985.
221. Smith, supra note 161.
222. Rigozzi, Hasler, & Quinn, supra note 220. Previously, CAS maintained
a separate arbitrator list for the various disputes related to the Fédération In-
ternationale de Football Association (FIFA).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Hiltzik, supra note 196. Many arbitrators appointed by CAS have
either current or prior professional relationships with WADA or other interna-
tional or national sports organizations. For example, “[o]f the 45 member[s] of
the North American branch, at least 24 ha[d] such affiliations” in 2006. Id.
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is important that parties have a wide choice of arbitrators to
choose from and for arbitrators to contribute to all types of dis-
putes brought to CAS.228 Concentration of specialized arbitra-
tors creates the potential for this narrow list of arbitrators to
form institutional bias.229
Lastly, the influence of the MHRC decision could compromise
the integrity of CAS and would have extensive negative implica-
tions on the development and role of global sports law.230 Lex
sportiva, which harmonizes both the specific principles of sport
and common legal principles, can only further develop if there is
an effective centralized mechanism of review.231 Additionally,
doubts about the legitimacy and loss of trust in CAS would
trickle down and affect the global public’s perception of individ-
ual sports institutions.232 Because of the development and vast
growth of CAS, the role of national courts has diminished, but
the reemergence of national courts could hamper further devel-
opment of a cohesive, global sports law system of adjudicating
disputes.233
C. Effects of the ECHR and the Fundamental Right to a Fair
Trial on the Grounds of Lack of Independence and Impartiality
in International Sports Arbitration
Another major concern for CAS’ reputation as an independent
and impartial dispute resolution tribunal is the pending deter-
mination by the ECtHR234 addressing whether the SFT violated
Pechstein’s right to a fair trial.235 If Pechstein prevails in the
ECtHR, it will provide other athletes with an additional, substi-
tute forum to bring their claims, consequently weakening CAS’
public perception as well as the goodwill of the IOC, which is
closely intertwined with CAS. Pechstein is not the first athlete
to claim that CAS violated his or her fundamental human
228. Rigozzi, Hasler, & Quinn, supra note 220.
229. Id.
230. See generally Casini, supra note 35, at 1317.
231. See id. at 1331.
232. See id. at 1334.
233. See id. at 1326.
234. Smith, supra note 161.
235. Article 6, Section 1 of the ECHR states: “In determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is enti-
tled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law.” ECHR, supra note 182, art. 6(1).
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rights.236 For example, in 2007, the SFT vacated and remanded
an arbitration award involving Argentinian professional tennis
player Guillero Canas and the Association of Tennis Profession-
als (“ATP”) Tour on the grounds that CAS did not provide Canas
the right to a fair hearing.237 The SFT ruled that CAS arbitrators
did not provide a “reasoned decision for rejecting arguments that
Canas’ doping sanction violated U.S. and European Union
laws.”238 Canas was drug tested during the ATP Abierto Mexi-
cano de Tenis tournament in Acapulco, Mexico.239 The test indi-
cated the presence of hydrochlorothiazide (“HCT”), which is a
prohibited substance under ATP Rules.240 Canas exercised his
right to a hearing by ATP’s Anti-Doping Tribunal.241 The tribu-
nal imposed a two-year ban and repayment of various earn-
ings.242 Subsequently, Canas appealed to CAS, where he claimed
he had inadvertently ingested medication prescribed for the
coach of another tournament player.243 Therefore, he argued
that the sanctions should be eliminated or reduced based on the
“No Fault or Negligence” provisions permitting reduction of in-
eligibility.244 The CAS panel partially upheld his ban.245 The
panel agreed with Canas regarding his inadvertent ingestion of
the prohibited substance.246 The panel determined, however,
236. Mitten, supra note 18, at 58; Thomas Schultz, Human Rights: A Speed
Bump for Arbitral procedures? An Exploration of Safeguards in the Accelera-
tion of Justice, 9 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 8, 14 (2006).
237. See Mitten, supra note 18, at 58; Canas & ATP Tour, CAS 2005/A/951,
Award (Ct. Arb. for Sports 2006) [hereinafter CAS 2005/A/951], http://law.mar-
quette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/2012-conf-canas-rev.pdf.
238. Mitten, supra note 18, at 58 (“The SFT ruled that CAS arbitrators are
required to discuss all of the parties’ arguments in their legal analysis of rele-
vant issues in dispute, including claims that applicable national or transna-
tional laws have been violated.”).
239. See CAS 2005/A/951.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Under the 2005 ATP Official Rulebook, “[i]f the Player establishes in
an individual case involving a Doping Offense under Article C.1 [Presence of
Prohibited Substance] or Article C.2 [Use of a Prohibited Substance] that he
bears No Fault or Negligence for the offense, the otherwise applicable period
of ineligibility shall be eliminated.” Id. The player has the burden of establish-
ing how the prohibited substance entered the player’s system. Id.
245. Id.
246. Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision, Mar. 22, 2007, 4P.172/2006 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4P.172/2006].
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that he was not entirely blameless because he did not receive the
medication from a doctor and, as an experienced professional
tennis player, he should have examined the medicine before in-
gesting it.247 On March 22, 2007, the SFT annulled the panel’s
award and remanded the case to CAS to revise the award.248 The
SFT determined that Canas’ right to a fair hearing was violated
because CAS disregarded alternative arguments submitted in
his defense.249 On remand, the panel revised the CAS award and
reduced Canas’ period of ineligibility,250 finding that the
“player’s [Canas’] ingestion of [HCT] was a mistake not caused
by his actions or those of any people within his control or sphere
of influence.”251
The Canas decision demonstrates an example of a strict view
of an athlete’s right to a fair hearing, however, there is currently
debate over whether human rights provisions, like Article 6 of
the ECHR, are applicable in private arbitration actions.252 Tra-
ditionally, human rights provisions do not directly apply to pri-
vate arbitration proceedings253 because covenants, such as the
ECHR, bestow responsibility on the states to enforce violations
of parties’ human rights.254 Since arbitration tribunals are not
state actors, the tribunals have no duty to uphold human rights
of others.255 As a result, specifically, the WADA Code, which all
international athletic federations and Olympics adhere to, allow
for an athlete’s right to a fair hearing.256
Further, various national governments have expressly stated
that national human rights provisions do not have a “direct hor-
izontal effect” on private bodies.257 This traditional view of hu-
man rights provisions means the right to a fair trial could only
247. Id.
248. See CAS 2005/A/951.
249. See Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision 4P.172/2006.
250. See CAS 2005/A/951.
251. Id.
252. Schultz, supra note 236, at 14.
253. Id. at 15.
254. Id. at 14.
255. Id.
256. Antonio Rigozzi, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, & Giorgio Malinverni,
Doping and Fundamental Rights, INT’L SPORTSL. REV., no. 3, 2004, at *39, *45.
In order to compete, Pechstein was subject to the restriction in the WADA
Code. CAS, supra note 26.
257. Rigozzi, Kaufmann-Kohler, & Malinverni, supra note 256, at *47 (“[A]s
a matter of principle, the fundamental rights granted by international (and
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be carried out if the federation enforcing the doping provision
was acting on the behalf of the state.258 In 2001, the SFT ex-
pressly held that athletes challenging an arbitral award could
not invoke the ECHR because the claims do not involve abuses
by states.259 This view, however, has been challenged by SFT de-
cisions in the past. For example, there have been various incon-
sistencies in the SFT’s perspective on the traditional view,260
and, in older cases, the SFT specifically has held that the guar-
antees of Article 6 ECHR “do not only concern state courts but
also tribunals of private nature.”261
While the ECHR does not have a “direct horizontal effect” in
the traditional sense,262 denying Pechstein’s fundamental rights
to a fair trial because she was forced to bring her claims in a
specific private forum is contrary to public policy. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that “every individual and
every organ of society should contribute to securing the univer-
sal observance of human rights.”263 This sentiment is directly
applicable to both Pechstein’s claims against the ISU and CAS
in general. The PIL Act enables CAS to enforce arbitration
agreements under Swiss law.264 As an ECHR Member State,
Switzerland must ensure that CAS agreements and procedures
meet fundamental standards of human rights, such as the right
to a fair trial.265 Further support for Pechstein’s fair trial claims
national) instruments of protection of human rights are not applicable in sports
matters decided by private bodies.”).
258. Id. at *46.
259. Schultz, supra note 236, at 14; see also Abel Xavier v. UEFA, Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal Decision, June 11, 2001, 4P.64/2001 (Switz.).
260. Schultz, supra note 236, at 14.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 15.
263. Id. at 16. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed
by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948, and set out universal
and fundamental human rights for all. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
264. See Downie, supra note 116, at 9.
265. See Schultz, supra note 236, at 15 (“As the ECHR guarantees the right
to a fair trial and the right of access to the courts, if a state decides to grant
validity to an agreement that removes a dispute from the judicial system, then
it must see to it that the substitute dispute resolution procedure globally meets
the standards that would otherwise have applied to the procedure in court.”).
Germany is also an ECHR Member State. 47 Member States, EUR. CT. HUM.
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are found in the due process guarantees adopted by the New
York Convention.266 If Pechstein were to succeed in the ECtHR,
it may inspire other athletes to bring CAS appeals to alternative
tribunals, which will undermine the goal of CAS to provide an
independent, efficient, and speedy forum for dispute settlement.
Therefore, it is paramount for CAS to address due process con-
cerns to ensure its reputation as a fair tribunal.
III. COMPARISON OF CAS TO THENFL ARBITRATOR SELECTION
PROCEDURES IN THEUNITED STATES AND SPORT RESOLUTIONS
IN THEUNITEDKINGDOM
Although CAS is regarded as the supreme forum for interna-
tional sports-related disputes, professional sports leagues in the
United States do not submit disputes between individual ath-
letes and the professional sport’s governing body to CAS. Specif-
ically, the National Football League (NFL) utilizes different ar-
bitrator selection procedures set out in labor agreements be-
tween athletes and owners. Similar to CAS, the arbitration pro-
cedures utilized by the NFL do not always appear impartial and
independent. For example, recently, NFL players have chal-
lenged arbitration decisions in national courts, criticizing the
NFL commissioner and the scope of his broad powers.267 In con-
trast to issues related to the commissioner’s broad discretionary
powers to handle arbitration proceedings in the NFL, the United
Kingdom has successfully implemented its own private tribunal,
“Sport Resolutions,” to hear professional sports-related disputes
that are influenced by, but varied from, CAS arbitration proce-
dures. Sport Resolutions was originally modeled after CAS in its
formation but has since developed its own specialized arbitra-
tion selection procedures, specifically implementing three-per-
son arbitration panels to suit the needs of sports disputes in the
United Kingdom. This Part will compare CAS to the arbitrator
selection procedures utilized by the NFL and discuss the grow-
ing concern over the independence and impartiality of the NFL’s
arbitration procedures. This Part will then highlight Sport Res-
olutions, the arbitration tribunal established in the United
Kingdom to handle sports disputes.
RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Expo_50years_02_ENG.pdf
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
266. See generally New York Convention, supra note 71.
267. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Professional Sports Arbitration in the United States
Although CAS is known as the “Supreme Court” of sports dis-
putes, it is not the only dispute resolution system utilized in
sports.268 Many arbitration systems have been influenced by the
formation and success of CAS, particularly in the area of dop-
ing.269 Professional sports leagues in the United States do not
submit arbitration proceedings to CAS.270 Instead, the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) handles many sports-related dis-
putes between individual athletes and leagues271 and adminis-
ters dispute resolution services with respect to disputes over
partnership proceeds, termination of sports executives, sales of
franchises, and various other contractual disputes in profes-
sional sports.272
The NFL sets out its arbitration clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) between the NFL Player’s Association
(NFLPA), the labor union representing professional football
players, and the owners of football teams.273 The CBA outlines
the arbitration procedures for both noninjury- and injury-based
268. See Blackshaw, supra note 93, at 169. Other sports dispute resolution
bodies include the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada, the Interna-
tional Basketball Federation Arbitral Tribunal in Geneva, Switzerland, the
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber based in Zurich, the Japanese Sports Arbi-
tration Agency in Tokyo, and Sport Resolutions in the United Kingdom. Sport
Resolutions will be further discussed below. See infra Part III.B.
269. See Blackshaw, supra note 93; Ryan Reszel, Guilty Until Proven Inno-
cent, and then Still Guilty: What the World Anti-Doping Agency Can Learn
From the National Football League About First-Time Anti-doping Violation, 29
WIS. INT’L L.J. 807, 812 (2012).
270. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Sports Arbitration Including Olympic Athlete
Disputes, ADR.ORG, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004199
(last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (describing the role that the American Arbitration
Association plays in settling professional sports disputes in the United States).
271. Id. at 4. Additionally, under the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act, AAA administers several types of disputes for the U.S. Olympic
Committee, including: (1) athlete eligibility for both the Olympic Games and
Pan-American games, (2) “determination[s] of the appropriate National Gov-
erning Body for a particular amateur sport,” and (3) positive drug tests outside
of competition. Id.
272. Id.
273. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
(2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA], https://nfllabor.files.word-
press.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf.
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grievances.274 Additionally, Article XI of the CBA provides for
discretionary discipline by the commissioner of the NFL, Roger
Goodell, through arbitration.275 The commissioner has discre-
tionary and disciplinary power over conduct considered “detri-
mental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of
professional football.”276 Essentially a catch-all, the CBA gives
the commissioner the express authority to define the scope of
detrimental conduct and to impose discipline he deems fit for the
conduct committed.277 Similar to the binding arbitration clauses
found in contracts between athletes and their respective athletic
federations, under the CBA, players are bound to the arbitration
procedures set forth and agreed to by the NFLPA and the owners
of the teams.
Under the appeals process set forth in the CBA, “the Commis-
sioner shall, after consultation with the Executive Director of
the NFLPA, appoint one or more designees to serve as hearing
officers. . . . [N]otwithstanding the foregoing, the Commissioner
may serve as [a] hearing officer in any appeal under his discre-
tion.”278 The NFL commissioner thus has exclusive authority to
choose the arbitrators in the appeals process, and may even se-
lect himself.279 Although this power was collectively bargained
for by the NFL and the NFLPA, it is drastically different than
274. See id. at 189, 195 (describing non-injury- and injury-based grievances).
Under Article IX, Section 1 of the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agree-
ment, a noninjury grievance is described as “[a]ny dispute arising after the
execution of this Agreement and involving the interpretation of, application of,
or compliance with, any provision of this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract,
or any applicable provision of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws pertaining to
terms and conditions of employment of NFL players.” Id.
275. The Commissioner of the NFL “represents the thirty-two NFL owners’
business interests and has the authority to suspend players for ‘conduct detri-
mental’ to the team or league, and then act as mutual arbiter in disputes in-
volving NFL Players Association and league.” Zachary Palva, Why the NFL
Should Re-Consider Goodell’s Role as Judge, Jury and Executor, FORDHAM
SPORTS L. FORUM (Apr. 17, 2016), http://fordhamsportslawforum.com/nfl/why-
the-nfl-should-re-consider-goodells-role-as-judge-jury-and-executioner/.
276. NFL CBA, supra note 273, at 204.
277. Mike Florio, “Conduct Detrimental” vs. “Equipment Violations” in Brady
v. NFL, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 8, 2015), http://profootball-
talk.nbcsports.com/2015/08/08/conduct-detrimental-vs-equipment-violations-
in-brady-vs-nfl/.
278. NFL CBA, supra note 273, at 204–05.
279. See id.
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typical arbitration clauses, in which “a neutral third-party arbi-
ter is appointed by both parties to make a binding decision with-
out preferential treatment to one side.”280 Goodell’s authority to
review his own decisions without any neutral third-party over-
sight, essentially gives him the power to be both judge and
jury.281
Additionally, any decision under appeal “will constitute a full,
final and complete disposition of the appeals, which will be bind-
ing on all parties.”282 This is comparable to CAS’ authority to act
as the final arbiter of appeals in the context of international
sports disputes. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), how-
ever, NFL players have the right to challenge the commissioner’s
ruling in federal court.283 But generally, courts in the United
States give deferential treatment to privately agreed upon arbi-
tration decisions and will only overturn an award where “evident
partiality or corruption” was committed by the arbitrator.284
Recently, the independence of arbitration proceedings and the
commissioner’s heavy-handed role in such proceedings has been
scrutinized. As a result, rather than accepting the selected hear-
ing officer’s determination as final and binding, athletes have
begun turning to national courts to overturn the arbitration de-
cisions.285 For example, in 2014, Baltimore Ravens running
back, Ray Rice, assaulted his then-fiancé in the elevator of an
Atlantic City Casino.286 After the incident, Goodell met with
Rice, who admitted wrongdoing, and suspended him for two
games in the upcoming season.287 Subsequent to the decision,
rumors of a second surveillance video created a media firestorm
280. Id.
281. Palva, supra note 275.
282. Reszel, supra note 269, at 816.
283. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2016). The Federal Arbitration Act states that arbi-
tration awards may be vacated “where there was evident partiality or corrup-
tion in the arbitrators.” Id.
284. Palva, supra note 275.
285. See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Play-
ers Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
286. See In the Matter of Ray Rice, ESPN (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf.
287. Id.
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criticizing the lenient suspension.288 Thereafter, Goodell sus-
pended Rice indefinitely.289 The NFLPA appealed the suspen-
sion, arguing that Goodell did not have the ability to go back and
change the suspension.290 In this instance, rather than appoint
himself to review the appeal, Goodell selected an independent
neutral arbitrator.291 The arbitrator found that Goodell’s adjust-
ment of Rice’s penalty from a two-game suspension to an indefi-
nite suspension was an abuse of discretion because “Rice did not
mislead the Commissioner and because there were no new facts
on which the Commissioner could base his increased suspen-
sion.”292
In 2015, the NFL suspended Minnesota Vikings running back,
Adrian Peterson, and similar to Rice, the decision was subse-
quently criticized for Commissioner Goodell’s heavy involve-
ment and conflict of interest. Peterson was suspended due to off-
the-field conduct after he was arrested for whipping his son with
a twig.293 At a disciplinary hearing conducted by Goodell, the
NFL determined that Peterson’s conduct was detrimental to the
NFL in accordance with the new Domestic Violence Policy en-
acted as a result of the Rice incident.294 Peterson appealed the
suspension in Minnesota District Court, which overturned the
suspension because the new Domestic Violence Policy enacted
by NFL was not in effect at the time the discipline was im-
posed.295 After an appeal by the NFL, however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the commissioner acted
within the powers given to him in the CBA and reinstated the
suspension.296 Although the court affirmed Commissioner
Goodell’s right to hear appeals of suspensions that he imposed
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Cole Renicker, A Comparative Analysis of the NFL’s Disciplinary
Structure: The Commissioner’s Power and Players’ Rights, 26 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 1051, 1056–57 (2016).
294. See Peter King, Peterson’s Punishment, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 18,
2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/11/18/adrian-peterson-suspension-appeal-
roger-goodell.
295. Ken Belson, Appeals Court Upholds N.F.L.’s Suspension of Peterson,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, at D2.
296. Id.
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previously, the tripanel of judges noted that “[a]llowing the com-
missioner . . . to hear challenges to the commissioner’s decision
may present an actual or apparent conflict of interest for the ar-
bitrator.”297
In addition to players’ off-the-field conduct, Goodell’s role as
the sole arbitrator concerning on-the-field conduct in “De-
flatgate” has resulted in further criticism.298 In 2015, the NFL
suspended New England Patriots quarterback, Tom Brady, un-
der Article 46 of the CBA, which specifically allows the commis-
sioner, in his sole discretion, to sit as arbitrator for all disputes
involving conduct detrimental to the sport, for four games for his
alleged involvement in underinflating footballs to gain a compet-
itive advantage during the 2015 American Football Conference
Championship Game.299 Because there was no league precedent
for suspensions relating to underinflating footballs, Brady was
seemingly suspended arbitrarily under the NFL’s drug policy.300
The NFLPA immediately appealed the decision seeking a neu-
tral arbitrator, citing “the NFL’s history of inconsistency and ar-
bitrary decisions in disciplinary matters, it is only fair that a
neutral arbitrator hear this appeal.”301 Subsequently, Judge
Berman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York vacated Brady’s four game suspension.302 Judge Ber-
man found that the suspension was arbitrary because Brady did
297. Id.
298. Renicker, supra note 293.
299. Tom Brady Suspension Case Timeline, NFL (July 15, 2016),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000492189/article/tom-brady-suspen-
sion-case-timeline; NFL CBA, supra note 273.
300. See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Play-
ers Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Commissioner Goodell stated
that Brady’s conduct improperly affected the competitive advantage and
threatened the integrity of the game, and “the ‘closest parallel’ for Brady is the
discipline approved for a first violation of the policy governing performance
enhancing drugs.” Steve Silva, Roger Goodell Says NFL’s Drug Penalties are
‘Closest Parallel’ to Tom Brady’s Punishment, BOSTON (July 28, 2015),
https://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patriots/2015/07/28/roger-
goodell-says-nfls-drug-penalties-are-closest-parallel-to-tom-bradys-punish-
ment.
301. Howard Ulman & Jimmy Golen,NFL Commissioner to Hear Brady Sus-
pension Appeal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 15, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/arti-
cle/352d3e3f2fa3495698f4e5392db49c84/deadline-looms-bradys-appeal-4-
game-suspension.
302. See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d.
2016] Rescuing the "Supreme Court" of Sports 317
not receive proper notice of a four-game suspension for underin-
flating footballs.303 Additionally, Judge Berman determined that
Brady was deprived due process because Jeff Pasch, the General
Counsel of the NFL, was able to review the initial independent
investigatory report conducted by NFL-appointed independent
investigator Ted Wells, but Brady was not given the opportunity
to review the documents.304 Berman cited the NFL’s lack of proof
that footballs were actually deflated, calling it “a quantum
leap.”305 Furthermore, Judge Berman criticized Goodell for “his
irrational twisting of highly equivocal evidence into the asser-
tion that Brady masterminded an illegal ‘scheme’ that was on
par with steroids.”306 After the NFL filed an appeal, however, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinstated Brady’s
suspension, holding that Goodell did not abuse his discretion
and acted within the powers given to him under the CBA.307
Ultimately, the CBA grants the commissioner discretion to up-
hold the integrity of the game.308 Accusations of biased investi-
gative and adjudicative processes, however, have undermined
both the players’ and public’s confidence in the NFL,309 primarily
303. Renicker, supra note 293.
304. Nat’l Football LeagueMgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d; seeMichael David
Smith, Judge Didn’t Buy NFL’s Claims that TedWells was “Independent,”NBC
SPORTS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/09/03/judge-
didnt-buy-nfls-claims-that-ted-wells-was-independent/.
305. Sally Jenkins, Roger Goodell’s Insistence on Acting as Emperor Makes
the NFL Vulnerable to a Legal Smackdown, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/deflategate-judge-doesnt-
seem-likely-to-rubber-stamp-roger-goodells-decisions/2015/08/21/034f8a26-
4747-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html?utm_term=.a4587e95118d.
306. Id.
307. Tom Brady Suspension Case Timeline, supra note 299. The majority
opinion stated: “We hold that the commissioner properly exercised his broad
discretion under the [CBA] and that his procedural rulings were properly
grounded in that agreement and did not deprive Brady of fundamental fair-
ness.” Id.
308. NFL CBA, supra note 273.
309. Michael Hurley,Roger Goodell, NFL Blasted for Bias, Dishonesty, Fraud
in N.Y. Law Professor’s DeflateGate Court Filing, CBS BOSTON (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015/12/18/roger-goodell-nfl-blasted-for-bias-dis-
honesty-fraud-in-n-y-law-professors-deflategate-court-filing/. New York law
professor, Robert Blecker, filed an amicus curiae brief with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in support of Brady and the NFLPA. Id. Blecker
criticized the NFL’s initial investigation, stating, “‘from the start, the NFL’s
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because the commissioner has the power to appoint himself as
both the disciplinarian and appeals arbitrator.310 The commis-
sioner’s discretion to choose himself as the “hearing officer” is
blatantly biased toward the league and decreases the credibility
of both the league and the commissioner.311 In the NFL, the com-
missioner’s power was collectively bargained for by the NFLPA
and the league. Although the court determined Goodell acted
properly in his role as arbitrator, the results from Deflatgate will
no doubt have a lasting effect on labor negotiations when the
current CBA is set to expire in 2021.312 Without player’s confi-
dence that disputes will be handled in an independent and im-
partial manner, more players will be motivated to bring appeals
to national courts. This will further undermine the NFL’s ability
to enforce the privately agreed-upon provisions in the CBA,
which govern the NFL and the professional football players.
The negative perception of the NFL and the inconsistent ac-
tions of the commissioner following the aforementioned cases
has undermined the public trust of both the league and the com-
missioner, and this serves as a cautionary tale for CAS. Similar
to the NFL CBA, Rule 40.2 of the 1994 CAS Code allows the
President of the Appeals Arbitration Division to appoint an ar-
bitrator in the absence of an agreement between the parties.313
Allowing the president of the division to select an arbitrator of
his choosing appears contradictory to the independence require-
ment stressed within the 1994 CAS Code.314 It is unlikely that
the president of the division, who is selected by ICAS through
investigation, adjudication, and punishment of Tom Brady for actively partic-
ipating in a scheme to illegally tamper with ball pressure has been infected
with bias, unfairness, evident partiality, and occasional fraud.’” Id.
310. NFL CBA, supra note 273.
311. SeeNate Davis,NFLPA Demand Roger Goodell Step Aside as Arbitrator
in Tom Brady’s Appeal, USA TODAY (May 15, 2015), http://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/nfl/patriots/2015/05/15/nflpa-appeal-letter-tom-brady-
roger-goodell-troy-vincent-deflategate-ted-wells/27371977/.
312. Sally Jenkins, Why Roger Goodell, not Tom Brady, is Deflategate’s Real
Loser, WASH. POST (July 19, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/sports/redskins/why-roger-goodell-not-tom-brady-is-deflategates-
real-loser/2016/07/19/946c09b2-4dcc-11e6-a422-
83ab49ed5e6a_story.html?utm_term=.ab2d7eeabfe9.
313. 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. R40.2.
314. See generally id. art. R33. CAS Code R33 expressly states that “[e]very
arbitrator shall be and remain impartial and independent of the parties.” Id.
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individual institutions and the IOC, will be able to select an un-
biased arbitrator.315 This in turn will lead to structural imbal-
ance and bias in the formation of CAS arbitration panels and
will undermine the legitimacy of the organization.
B. Sport Resolutions in the United Kingdom
Unlike the NFL and CAS, Sport Resolutions in the United
Kingdom is viewed as an independent, affordable, speedy, and
confidential forum.316 Established in 2000 and governed by Eng-
lish law, Sport Resolutions was modeled after CAS317 and offers
arbitration and mediation services for over fifty different sports
in the United Kingdom.318 Additionally, it is the independent
provider of the United Kingdom’s anti-doping panel—the Na-
tional Anti-doping Panel.319 The National Anti-Doping Panel is
an independent organization responsible for ensuring that all
sports bodies in the United Kingdom comply with WADA.320 Ar-
bitration clauses establishing Sport Resolutions as the inde-
pendent dispute resolution service have been incorporated into
many British athletic institutions’ agreements.321
It can be argued that Sport Resolutions adopted many of the
basic concepts initiated by CAS but utilizes them in a more in-
dependent and impartial manner. For example, unlike CAS,
which is controlled primarily by the IOC and the individual fed-
erations, Sport Resolutions is not controlled by many different
athletic interest groups.322 The Sport Resolutions board is con-
315. See id. art. S4(1) (“The International Council of Arbitration for Sport
Composition.”).
316. See Edward Procter, Dispute Resolution in Sport: The Role of Sport Res-
olutions, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., no. 1, 2010, at *3, *3.
317. Blackshaw, supra note 93, at 181.
318. Id. at 182. The most common areas where Sport Resolutions exercises
jurisdiction are athlete selection, child protection for underage athletes, player
eligibility, and anti-doping. Procter, supra note 316, at *3.
319. See Blackshaw, supra note 93, at 181.
320. See generally What We Do, U.K. ANTI-DOPING,
http://www.ukad.org.uk/our-organisation/what-we-do/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2016).
321. See Blackshaw, supra note 93, at 182. The British Olympic Committee
also incorporated Sport Resolutions into its commercial contracts. The provi-
sion forces parties to go through the mediation procedures set forth by Sport
Resolutions before the dispute can be settled by arbitration proceedings. Id.
322. See Procter, supra note 316, at *3.
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trolled by nine different groups, including Olympic and Para-
lympic associations from England, Scotland, Wales, and North-
ern Ireland as well as professional players associations, spon-
sors, and governing bodies.323 In the formation of the Sport Res-
olutions board, individual professional athletes varying inter-
ests were represented, unlike CAS, where athlete’s interests
were, and still are, only represented by their individual sporting
institutions.324 The general aim of Sports Resolutions is to pro-
vide athletes in the United Kingdom with equality and diversity
in resolving athletic disputes.325 Additionally, Sport Resolutions
stresses the importance of applying Article 6 of the ECHR,326 be-
lieving that every athlete has “an entitlement to a fair and rea-
sonable hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”327
The panel of arbitrators available in Sport Resolutions is also
more specialized than the arbitrators available under CAS. The
panel of arbitrators in Sport Resolutions tribunals is made up of
one or three arbitrators.328 The arbitrators are selected from four
specialized groups: (1) a chairpersons’ list—which requires the
323. See Blackshaw, supra note 93, at 182; Procter, supra note 316, at *4.
324. See generally 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133.
325. See Procter, supra note 316, at *3.
326. Disciplinary Procedures, SPORT RESOLUTIONS, https://www.sportresolu-
tions.co.uk/resources/dispute-guidance/disciplinary-procedures (last visited
Mar. 3, 2017).
327. Id.
328. SPORT RESOLUTIONS, ARBITRATION RULES OF SPORT RESOLUTIONS (2015),
https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/uploads/related-documents/D_3_-_Arbitra-
tion_Rules.pdf.
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individual selected to be a solicitor or barrister329 with a profes-
sional interest in sports;330 (2) a commercial arbitrators’ list;331
(3) a professionals’ list;332 and (4) a lay members’ list.333 Every
arbitration tribunal includes an arbitrator from the chairper-
son’s list.334 Panel members appointed to the chairpersons’ list
must have at least seven years of legal and arbitration experi-
ence to ensure they are able to lead a tribunal quickly and effi-
ciently.335 When parties elect to use the tripanel, in addition to
the chairperson, the two additional panel members of the arbi-
tration panel, known as wing members, are selected from the
commercial arbitrators’ list, the professionals’ list, and the lay
members’ list.336
Inclusion of professional and lay members lists ultimately help
to accomplish Sport Resolutions goals of equality and diver-
sity.337 While the chairperson’s list of arbitrators must have ex-
pert legal training, the wing members have a broader range of
professional backgrounds.338 The commercial arbitrators must
be professionally qualified to arbitrate commercial disputes
329. In the United Kingdom, lawyers are referred to as solicitors and barris-
ters.What is the Difference Between Attorney, Barrister, Lawyer, and Solicitor?,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://blog.dictionary.com/lawyer-vs-attorney/ (last visited
Jan. 6, 2017). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a solicitor refers to “a [Brit-
ish] lawyer who consults with clients and prepares legal documents but is not
generally heard in High Court . . . unless specially licensed.” Solicitor, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Additionally, a barrister is “a lawyer who is
admitted to plead at the bar and who may argue cases in superior courts.” Bar-
rister, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
330. The chairperson’s list appoints individuals with expert experience in the
various types of disputes that Sport Resolutions has jurisdiction over. Procter,
supra note 316, at *4.
331. See id. Arbitrators must have professional qualifications, a professional
interest in sport, and completed at least ten arbitrations as a sole arbitrator.
Id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See SPORT RESOLUTIONS, APPLYING FOR MEMBERSHIP OF SPORT
RESOLUTIONS (UK) PANELS OF ARBITRATORS AND MEDIATORS: SELECTION
CRITERIA 2015, at 4–5 (2015) [hereinafter PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA],
https://www.sportresolutions.co.uk/uploads/related-documents/B1_-
_Panel_Selection_Criteria_2015.pdf.
335. See id. at 5.
336. See id. at 4–5.
337. See id. at 2.
338. See Arbitration FAQs, SPORT RESOLUTIONS, https://www.sportresolu-
tions.co.uk/faqs/arbitration (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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through a national accreditation body, such as the Chartered In-
stitute of Arbitrators.339 Additionally, all commercial members
must have a professional interest in sports.340 The professional
list consists of arbitrators with professional experience sitting
on arbitration panels as wing members in cases where technical
expertise is necessary.341 Finally, lay group members are re-
quired to have experience in sports, either as a competitor,
coach, official, sponsor, or in other similar capacities.342
Sport Resolutions also offers flexibility in curating custom ar-
bitration panels.343 Parties to arbitration can either select arbi-
trators from a list provided by Sport Resolutions or may ask to
appoint arbitrators with specific skills and experience.344 Parties
involved in these arbitration proceedings have more confidence
that the panel before them has an adequate understanding of
the dispute and that each parties’ interests will be equally rep-
resented. Therefore, parties feel that they will be heard by a
panel of procedural and substantive experts who do not have a
vested interest in the outcome,345which creates confidence in the
system and legitimizes the organization. CAS arbitrators must
have appropriate legal training and experience with sports law
to conduct the arbitration, but the closed list of arbitrators are
primarily appointed by the IOC and other governing bodies who
are commonly connected to disputes being handled.346 As a re-
sult, arbitration selection in CAS is inadequate to ensure ath-
letes bringing forth appeals will not be met with a panel with
inherent biases and ties to the IOC.
IV. SOLUTION
In order to remain the supreme forum to settle international
sports disputes, CAS must implement further revisions to en-
sure that the selection list of arbitrators who are available to
hear disputes is free from institutional bias and does not deprive
athletes of the fundamental human right to a fair trial. Regard-
less of the outcome in the German Federal Supreme Court and
339. Procter, supra note 316, at *5.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See generally Arbitration FAQs, supra note 338.
344. Id.
345. See Disciplinary Procedures, supra note 326.
346. See 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. S14.
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the ECtHR, if athletes do not trust CAS as a neutral forum to
hear grievances, CAS will be rendered obsolete. Thus, CAS must
revise Article S14 of the 1994 CAS Code, which governs arbitra-
tor selection procedures, to create specialized lists of arbitrators
with different experience in both dispute resolution and sports.
Additionally, in order to enhance the integrity of the arbitration
process, CASmust enforce binding precedent with regard to past
arbitration decisions. This Part will propose that CAS arbitrator
selection procedures in the 1994 CAS Code be amended to utilize
a tripanel of arbitrators composed from three specialized groups
to ensure a more impartial and independent arbitration. Addi-
tionally, this Part will propose that CAS adopt the doctrine of
stare decisis, giving precedential value to past CAS arbitral
awards, which will compel the CAS tripanels of arbitrators to
make more consistent and balanced award decisions.
A. Adopt Sport Resolutions Arbitrator Selection Procedures
Article S14 of the 1994 CAS Code must be revised in order to
eliminate concerns of institutional bias.347 CAS should assemble
specialized groups of available arbitrators into arbitration pan-
els, similar to the arbitrator selection method utilized by Sport
Resolutions.348 Implementing three categories of arbitrators,
modeled after Sport Resolutions, will help ensure that the panel
of arbitrators is not hand selected by the IOC or other governing
bodies. Three member panels would allow for “the opportunity
to give and take during the deliberation process [and provide] an
excellent way to ensure a fair result.”349 Replacing the current
appointment system will create a greater level of expertise about
the dispute at hand, which would instill confidence in the inter-
national sports community.350 Unlike current CAS arbitration
procedures, which state that arbitration panels may be com-
prised of either one or three arbitrators, the proposed tripan-
els351 should consist of: (1) one experienced lead chairperson, (2)
347. See Haas, supra note 194, at *76.
348. See PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 334 (describing the criteria
for appointment to each member list).
349. John P. DiBlasi, The Commercial Arbitration – The Single Arbitrator
Versus the Tri-Panel, NAT’L ARB. & MEDIATION (June 2014),
http://www.namadr.com/DIBLASI.JOHN.MAKING.THE.COMMERCIAL.AR
BITRATION.THE.SINGLE.ARBITRATOR.VERSUS.THE.TRI-PANEL.CFM.
350. See Procter, supra note 316, at *3.
351. See 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. S3.
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one experienced sports professional from a specialized list, and
(3) one layperson with experience in sports.352 Consistent use of
tripanels, made up of members of each list, will be more benefi-
cial than a single arbitrator because multiperson panels help to
ensure that decision-making will be more balanced.353 It is im-
possible to eliminate all arbitrators with an affiliation to the IOC
or an international athletic federation. In fact, it would be a det-
riment to the accuracy and efficiency of arbitration because
members of the IOC and the international federations have vast
knowledge in sports and the disputes that arise. But, in order to
eliminate perceived bias and establish CAS independence, the
IOC and international federations shall be able to appoint no
more than one-third of the arbitration pools.
First, a chairpersons or legal member list consisting of law-
yers, judges, or accredited arbitrators will be pooled, allowing
the disputing parties to select a chairperson for the arbitration
panel.354 It is essential that the individuals appointed to this list
not only have experience conducting arbitration proceedings but
also have a professional interest in sports as well.355 Each mem-
ber’s knowledge of both law and sports should be broad enough
to ensure they are able to hear a wide variety of disputes in a
timely and efficient manner.356 Unlike current CAS procedures,
in which the president of the Appeals Arbitration Division se-
lects the lead arbitrator, the parties shall jointly select the arbi-
trator to lead the panel hearing their dispute.357 The lead arbi-
trator seated on the tripanel would ultimately safeguard the
need for speedy and efficient dispute resolution in international
sports.358 Allowing both parties to jointly select the lead arbitra-
tor reassures all parties involved that fundamental bias against
one of the parties is eliminated.
Additionally, the wing members of the arbitration panel
should be selected from lists of specialized individuals who have
352. Procter, supra note 316, at *5.
353. See DiBlasi, supra note 349 (comparing the advantages and disad-
vantages of single arbitrator versus tripanels).
354. PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 334, at 4–5.
355. See Procter, supra note 316, at *3.
356. Id. at *4. In Sport Resolutions, arbitrators appointed to the chairper-
son’s list lead tribunals concerning “anti-doping, child protection, disciplinary
and regulatory, eligibility, and selection hearings.” Id. at *5.
357. 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. R40.2.
358. Reilly, supra note 19, at 63.
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expert knowledge on the disputed subject.359 Members seated in
the two wing positions of the arbitration panel will be selected
from a specialist list and a layperson’s list.360 The specialist list
will be comprised of experienced, accredited arbitrators who
have professional experience in sports or professional qualifica-
tions in areas such as anti-doping and accounting.361 Having an
arbitrator with superior knowledge on such technical subjects
will facilitate a speedy and efficient resolution of the dispute at
hand.
The most important member list implemented, however, will
be the layperson’s list. Members will be comprised of arbitrators
experienced in sports on both the national and international
level.362 Like Sport Resolutions, members appointed to the lay-
person panel will have experience either as a coach, official, ad-
ministration, or an actual competitor.363 Arbitrators with
firsthand experience either competing or coaching will provide
an in-depth perspective on the specific issue, which will instill
confidence in all the parties involved.364 This will provide a
greater and much-needed balance between the athletic federa-
tions’ interests and those of the athletes.
To implement the specialized tripanels, ICAS must revise the
1994 CAS Code.365 Any changes to the 1994 CAS Code must be
decided by a full meeting of ICAS with two-third of its members
present.366 It would be drastic for ICAS to attempt to put the new
specialized arbitrator groups into effect immediately. Therefore,
new appointment procedures should be effective within two
years of the revision. ICAS should also create advisory commit-
tees to select applications of new potential arbitrators. The ad-
visory appointment committees shall be made from current
ICAS members, current arbitrators, and various members of the
international athletic community and would include athletes,
359. PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 334, at 5–6.
360. See Procter, supra note 316, at *4.
361. See id. at *2. Expertise in areas such as chemistry, medicine, and psy-
chology are helpful in hearing anti-doping appeals. See id. at *5.
362. See id. at *5.
363. See id. at *3.
364. See id. at *5 (“[B]ecause decisions are made by expert, not generalist,
judges who can be expected to understand the sporting context in which dis-
putes occur.”).
365. See id.
366. See id.
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coaches, officials, and representatives of athletic governing bod-
ies. Currently, CAS arbitrators are appointed to renewable four-
year terms.367 A two-year grace period would thus enable ICAS
to evaluate the criteria for creating the specialized arbitrator
groups and assess all current arbitrators to determine whether
or not they fit the criteria. Additionally, ICAS shall amend the
1994 CAS Code to limit CAS arbitrator terms to two renewable
four-year periods. Limiting terms will help to alleviate perceived
bias and avoid attempts by arbitrators to act as the mouthpiece
of the IOC or other international governing bodies.
Due to the close scrutiny surrounding CAS and its relationship
with the IOC and other governing bodies, participating adverse
parties must trust that there are adequate, independent dispute
resolution procedures in place.368 Creation of a tripanel,369 led by
a neutral chairperson and two wing panelists with specialized
experience in the subject matter in dispute, will quell concerns
of dependence and institutional bias. If parties trust CAS is a
neutral forum that is independent from the IOC, athletes will
not turn to national courts. Furthermore, if national courts be-
lieve CAS is a fair tribunal, cases challenging CAS arbitration
awards will not be litigated.
B. Adopt the Doctrine of Stare Decisis in CAS Arbitration
Awards
Contrary to general arbitration practices, CAS should adopt a
doctrine of stare decisis.370 Horizontal consistency in arbitration
awards is important in order for future cases filed in CAS371 to
367. 1994 CAS CODE, supra note 133, art. S13.
368. Procter, supra note 316, at *5. One way in which Sport Resolutions en-
sures that adequate and fair arbitration procedures are being utilized is by
providing information and training to arbitrators about the consequences of
giving an unfair or incorrect award. Id. Additionally, to dispel concerns regard-
ing Sport Resolutions’ funding in anti-doping cases, a third-party, the Depart-
ment of Culture Media and Sports, directly funds proceedings to “ensure that
a financial relationship does not exist between the anti-doping prosecution
body and the anti-doping tribunal.” Id.
369. See PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA, supra note 334, at 4.
370. Rosmarijn van Kleef, Reviewing Disciplinary Sanctions in Sports, 4
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L COMP. L. 3, 21 (2015); Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[Stare Decisis is a] doctrine of precedent, under
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise
again in litigation.”).
371. Kleef, supra note 370, at 21–22.
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“remain identical and universal across time and subject mat-
ter.”372 Consistency in final arbitration awards will provide uni-
formity and will establish CAS as an impartial forum.373 Alt-
hough arbitrators consider past CAS awards in making their de-
cision, past decisions are ultimately not binding.374 CAS arbitra-
tion decisions must follow precedent of past decisions of similar
nature, as they do in a court of law in common law systems.375
Additionally, implementing stare decisis will contribute to the
advanced development and harmonization of global sports law—
lex sportiva. Through its awards, CAS has made important con-
tributions to developing and interpreting sports law.376 Acceler-
ation of the harmonization of specific sports principles and gen-
eral principles of law will contribute to a streamlined body of
global sports law, which will benefit the international sports
community as a whole.377 Harmonization of these principles will
help protect all athletes’ fundamental rights without involving
domestic courts.378 If adverse parties trust that the arbitrator’s
determinations are based on past decisions involving similar
facts, CAS will appear more transparent and independent from
the influence of the IOC and other governing bodies. Implement-
ing a policy of binding precedent will thus enhance the integrity
of the arbitration process.
CONCLUSION
To maintain CAS’ position as the “Supreme Court” of sports, it
is crucial that the international athletic community trusts that
the tribunal is impartial and independent from the IOC and
other governing bodies. Although CAS has attempted to distance
itself from the IOC,379 its efforts have been insufficient in main-
taining the independence and integrity of the court thus far. Ul-
372. Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in International Dispute Settle-
ment, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 47 (2008).
373. See id.
374. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 20, at 286; Mitten, supra note 18, at 58–
59. In an effort to achieve greater transparency, CAS provides a public data-
base of all past arbitration awards. See CT. ARB. SPORT, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
375. See Stare Decisis, supra note 370.
376. See Casini, supra note 35, at 1326.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See supra Part II.B.
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timately, CAS cannot maintain its position as the exclusive fo-
rum for international sports disputes if athletes continually ig-
nore its rulings and challenge them in national courts, where
vastly inconsistent rulings may result across different jurisdic-
tions. Significant revisions to the arbitration member selection
procedures must be implemented to ensure that CAS is free from
institutional bias. The CAS must adopt an arbitration panel
with broad legal knowledge and specialized expertise in sports
to ensure that numerous types of disputes will be decided fairly.
A tripanel system influenced by Sport Resolutions will guaran-
tee balance between governing bodies and individual athletes.380
Furthermore, adoption of the doctrine of stare decisis will force
arbitrators to make consistent rulings.381 As a result, if adverse
parties perceive CAS as the neutral and supreme forum for dis-
pute resolution, national courts will as well.382 By implementing
these changes, CAS will become a fair and balanced arbitration
panel, securing CAS as the world’s “Supreme Court” of sports
and the further development of lex sportiva.
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